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Must Courts Respect Hidden
Legislative Bargains?
by BRENDAN SELBY*

Introduction
In 2015, the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), otherwise known as
"Obamacare," faced its second big test in the Supreme Court. The issue
before the Court was whether the text of the Act allowed the IRS to give
tax-credit subsidies for insurance coverage purchased on a health insurance
exchange established by the federal government. King v. Burwell' was a
momentous case for public policy, but it is also important for the practice
of statutory interpretation. Perhaps no case better illustrates the resurgence
of a particularly strong form of textualism-called "new textualism"--that
has been brewing in courts and law reviews for the past several decades.
One of the arguments raised by the IRS was that the challengers'
reading of the statute "would render several other provisions of the [Act]
absurd," and would so seriously undermine the purposes of the Act, that it
was at least ambiguous as to whether Congress intended this reading.
Responding to this argument, the D.C. Circuit relied on a principle that lies
at the heart of new textualist thinking. The D.C. Circuit wrote: "The
Constitution assigns the legislative power to Congress, and Congress alone,
see U.S. Const. art. I, Sec 1, and legislating often entails compromises that
courts must respect."3
The D.C. Circuit stated that, even where
circumstances suggest a drafting error, the court should leave it to Congress
to fix the error, 4unless the plain text crosses a "high threshold of
unreasonableness."
Six justices on the Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's approach
and held that the "structure and context" of the ACA evinced the intent to
* Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources
Division, Environmental Crimes Section. The views expressed are the author's own.
1. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)
2.
3.

Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 402 (emphasis added).

4.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[587]
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subsidize the purchase of insurance on exchanges set up by the federal
government on a state's behalf. The majority opinion, authored by Chief
Justice Roberts, relied heavily on the idea that the Court should not
severely undermine a central purpose of the ACA based on plain text
reading that was likely not intended by those who passed the law. Three
justices, however, concluded that the statute's language was so clear that no
alternative reading was even plausible. Their position was supported by
numerous scholars who invoked the D.C. Circuit's argument about
legislative bargains. 5
There was no direct evidence of a legislative compromise on the
specific question of subsidy eligibility; no evidence that even a single
lawmaker intended to leave consumers who used federally established
exchanges ineligible. To the contrary, according to The New York Times,
"interviews with more than two dozen Democrats and Republicans
involved in writing the law" showed that the disputed provisions were
likely the product of a drafting error. 6 The interviews provided no evidence
for the speculative compromise imagined by the D.C. Circuit.
The only evidence of compromise on the issue teed up in King came
from the literal words of the Act itself. According to new textualism, the
very oddness of a strict plain text 8 reading of the statute may be evidence of
a potential compromise. This is not a novel or controversial idea. What is
new to new textualism, however, is that proponents view the oddness of the
plain text as a sufficient reason to adhere to a more literal interpretation.
New textualists have adopted a "presumption of compromise" where the
language9 of a statute creates results that are odd, incongruous, or downright
"goofy." The presumption applies even when there is no corroborating
evidence of compromise; the mere possibility is enough to trigger the

5. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Administrative & Constitutional Law Professors in
Support of Petitioners at 17-19, 39, King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114); Brief
of Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon as Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioners at 4, King
v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114).
6. Robert Pear, Four Words That Imperil Health Care Law Were All a Mistake, Writers
Now Say, N.Y. TIMES, (May 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/contested
-words-in-affordable-care-act-may-have-been-left-by-mistake.html.

7.

Id.

8. The term "plain text" is itself not without ambiguity. I use the term as understood by
textualists, to refer to the statutory language in semantic isolation, without consideration of its
purpose or nonlinguistic context. "Plain meaning," in turn, is the meaning of the text that would
be given by a "skilled, objectively reasonable user of words." See John F. Manning, Textualism
and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 109 (2001) [hereinafter Manning, Equity]
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
9. See John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of ConstitutionalPower, 128 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 10 (2014) [hereinafter Manning, ConstitutionalPower].
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conclusion brought home forcefully by the D.C. Circuit: courts must
respect legislative compromise, wherever it might possibly exist.l0
The need to preserve legislative compromise is not merely a
consequence of new textualism-it is a central justification for the theory.
And it is what largely distinguishes new textualism from more moderate
forms of textualism. I refer to it as the "Bargaining Argument" ("BA").
The importance of the BA to the defense of textualism has gone largely
unrecognized. Nor has the argument been directly and comprehensively
contested. 1'
The BA begins from the premise that the Constitution was designed to
protect minority rights. In particular, the Constitution gives political
minorities an outsized right to insist upon legislative compromise. To
effectuate this purpose, courts must respect legislative compromises that
appear in a statutory text to the maximum extent possible. A second
premise is that any piece of statutory text might be the result of legislative
compromise, i.e., a bargain struck between two or more interested actors
over what the words should say.' 2 The conclusion of the argument is that
courts should rarely, if ever, deviate from the plain text of a statute, lest
they disrupt a bargain that the Constitution requires to be protected.
This article will pursue three broad claims:
First, while new textualism has been supported by numerous
arguments, the BA has become the most important. Unlike other, less
formalistic arguments for new textualism, the BA allows proponents to
claim that their theory is mandated under the Constitution. The impact of
the argument is also far-reaching: it has become the central justification for
textualism among both academics and judges.
Second, the BA lacks adequate support. In particular, proponents
have not explained why the Constitution's solicitude for minority rights
10. The application by some textualists of a narrow, rarely invoked "absurdity doctrine" is a
minor qualification to this point that the reader should bear in mind throughout this Article. See
generally John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003) [hereinafter
Manning, Absurdity]. For simplicity's sake, I do not discuss the doctrine at length, and I
paraphrase the strong textualist position as one that seeks to preserve compromise to the
maximum extent possible, which should be read to mean: to the extent there is any reasonable
possibility the statutory provision at issue was the result of the compromise.
11. This is not to say that the argument has not been contested at all. Jonathan Molot, for
example, seems to be talking about the BA when he notes that certain "aggressive textualists"
have tended to focus on "just one element of the judicial role-the judiciary's responsibility for
protecting the constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures." Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise
andFallof Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53-59 (2006). Molot argues that such textualists
have neglected the equally important constitutional prescription of separation of powers,
particularly the responsibility ofjudges to "cabin the influence of particularly powerful interests."
Id.
12. 1 use the terms "bargain" and "compromise" interchangeably.
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requires the preservation of legislative compromise to the maximum extent
possible. This Article will refer to this purported requirement as the
"maximalist position" with regard to legislative compromise. Unless the
maximalist position can be defended, textualists cannot explain why the
mere possibility that a statutory provision resulted from a bargain requires
that courts must adhere to the literal text against opposing indicia of intent.
Third, I suggest that without the BA, textualists cannot show that their
theory is grounded in more objective criteria than alternatives such as
moderate purposivism. This is not to say that such a showing could not
been made; merely that it has not yet been made. Textualism is portrayed
as having a theoretical soundness that it has not attained.
I. Varieties of Textualism
The term "textualism" encompasses a number of related theories. My
goal in this section is not to provide yet another explanation of what
textualism is, but merely to situate the BA within the framework of
textualist theories.
All textualist theories in some way prioritize the plain meaning of a
legal text,' 3 and they fall under the faithful agency model of statutory
interpretation.1 4 In this section, I briefly describe three versions of
textualism.
First, there is an older "plain meaning" school, which held that where
the plain meaning is clear, there is no need to look outside the "four
corners" of the legislative enactment at all. 15 This school was prominent in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.16 Courts following this approach
tended to speak "as if the determination that a' 7statute had a 'plain meaning'
foreclosed any necessity to consider context."'
Next there is what William Eskridge has called the "traditional
approach" to statutory interpretation. This approach adopted what he calls
the "soft plain meaning rule." Under the traditional approach, plain
meaning is the "best evidence of legislative intent," but it may be rebutted
by compelling evidence of a contrary legislative intent, including from
13.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 231
(2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE ET AL., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION].

14. Thomas M. Merrill, FaithfulAgent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation,LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1567 (2010); see also Manning, Equity, supra note 8, at 5 ("In our
constitutional system, it is widely assumed that federal judges must act as Congress's faithful
agents.").
15. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 79 & n.29 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What Divides].
16.

Id.

17.

Id.
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extratextual sources like legislative history. 18 Unlike the plain meaning
school, the traditional approach did not foreclose consideration of any
relevant context. According to Eskridge, this form of textualism is
consistent with the Supreme Court's "practice for most of [the 20th]
century."'19
The theory that will be the central focus of this article, new textualism,
holds that the only object of statutory interpretation is to determine the
meaning of the text and that "the only legitimate sources for this inquiry are
text-based or -linked sources.' 20 In contrast to the plain meaning school,
new textualists are willing to consider context outside the four comers of
the text, particularly "semantic context-evidence that goes to the way a
The
reasonable person would use language under the circumstances.'
semantic context tells us how an ordinary user of legal language would
interpret the text. 22 But the ordinary user of legal language is unlikely to be
an ordinary citizen. Instead, she is likely to be an expert who understands
"specialized conventions," including canons of construction. 23 Under new
textualism, then, the plain meaning of statutory language, standing by
itself, may be rebutted by semantic context such as an applicable canon of
construction.
An essential difference between the soft plain meaning rule and new
textualism, and one that will be a central focus of this Article, is that under
the latter approach, if the plain meaning of the text would be clear to the
relevant interpreter (taking into account semantic context), then the
"background purposes" of the statute are irrelevant. 24 New textualists
"give determinative weight to clear semantic clues even when they conflict
with the policy context." 25 Manning defines "policy context" as "evidence
that suggests the way a reasonable person would address the mischief being
remedied. ' 2 6 This definition is consistent with the "strong purposivism" of
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. For the remainder of this Article, however, I
will rely on a slightly broader definition, one that is compatible with a more
moderate purposivism. I define "policy context" as nonsemantic evidence
of "how the enacting legislature would have decided the interpretive

18.
19.

William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626, 623 (1990).
Id. at 628.

20.

ESKRIDGE ET AL., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 236.

21.

Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 76.

22.

Id. at 78.

23.

Id. at 78, 98.

24.

Id. at 73.

25.
26.

Id.
Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 76.
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27

question facing the court.,
This definition lacks the assumption
that the
28
available.
remedy
reasonable
most
the
legislature has sought
New textualism is not a monolithic theory, and its proponents do not
always agree. For example, new textualists disagree about whether judges
are justified in applying the absurdity doctrine, which holds that courts may
deviate from the plain meaning of a statute when it produces absurd
results. 29 But an important point for this Article is that, of the small
number of judges and academics who have vaulted new textualism to
prominence, all have espoused some form of the BA.3 °
There is general agreement that the leading new textualist judges
include Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas and
Judge Frank Easterbrook on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. After
King, we can probably add Justice Samuel Alito to this list. Among
academics, the leading theoretician of statutory textualism is undoubtedly
John Manning. Manning has written numerous articles about textualism,
and William
Eskridge has identified Manning as "new textualism's main
31
defender.

Other forms of textualism exist besides new textualism. But the new
textualism espoused by Scalia, Easterbrook, and Manning is by far the most
influential version of the theory, both in academia and in courts. As will be
shown below, its proponents rely heavily on the BA. Therefore, I will use
the term "textualism" from this point forward to refer particularly to new
textualism. Moreover, because Manning has put forth the most complete
and sophisticated exposition of the argument, I will treat his version as
authoritative for purposes of this Article.

27.

Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative

Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation,68 TUL. L. REv. 803,

813 (1994).
28. Note that this definition is compatible with a more nuanced form of intentionalism,
which is not concerned with the actual subjective intent of legislators but rather with constructing
a fictive intent based on reading the text as embodying one legislative "voice."
29. Compare Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528-29 (1989) (applying
the absurdity doctrine), with Manning, Absurdity, supra note 10 at 2395 (arguing against the
doctrine).
30. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (Thomas, J., majority opinion); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 535 (1983); Manning, Absurdity, supra
note 10, at 2390.
31. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial
Power" in Statutory Interpretation,1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 (2001) [hereinafter
Eskridge, All About Words].
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II. What Is The Bargaining Argument?
The BA has been around in inchoate form for several decades.

In

1984, a unanimous Supreme Court in Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System v. Dimension FinancialCorp. articulated the core argument

as it might be summed up today:
The "plain purpose" of legislation ... is determined in the

first instance with reference to the plain language of the
Application of "broad purposes" of
statute itself.
legislation at the expense of specific provisions ignores the
complexity of the problems Congress is called upon to
address and the dynamics of legislative action. Congress
may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague
social or economic evil; however, because its Members
may differ sharply on the means for effectuating that
intent, the final language of the legislation may reflect
hard-fought compromises.
Invocation of the "plain
purpose" of legislation at the expense of the terms of the
statute itself takes no account of the processes of
compromise and, in the end, prevents the effectuation of
congressional intent.32
Frank Easterbrook argues in his influential article, The Court and the
Economic System, that "[i]f legislation grows out of compromises among
special interests," courts should not rely on the purpose of the legislation to
"get more of what Congress wanted. 33 Like the Court's reasoning in
Dimension Financial Corp.,

Easterbrook

considers

the

purposivist

approach inappropriate in large part because it is unfaithful to the
Congressional intent to compromise. As he put it, "[w]hat Congress
wanted was the compromise, not the objectives of the contending
interests. 34
As these examples suggest, earlier versions of the BA tended to be a
reaction against the excesses of a strong purposivist approach that viewed
statutory language through the rose-colored glasses of legislators' "publicregarding rhetoric" describing its overriding purpose, without recognizing

32. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp. 474 U.S. 361, 373-74
(1986) (citation omitted).
33. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court andthe Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4,46
(1984).
34. Id.
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that the terms may in fact reflect competing purposes and interests.35 This
concern predates new textualism. In a 1970 Supreme Court decision, for
example, the Court counseled against "[r]adical reinterpretations" of
statutory language "in order to effectuate a broad policy." 36 The Court
stated: "Care must be taken... to respect the limits up to which Congress
was prepared to enact a particular policy, especially when the boundaries of
a statute are drawn as a compromise resulting from the countervailing
pressures of other policies. 37
The inchoate version of the argument did not uniquely support new
textualism. As the passages above demonstrate, it was framed primarily as
a way of getting at congressional intent. 38 By contrast, the argument for
textualism is a more formalistic and less concerned with a search for
"intent." It holds that a clear text should prevail even over evidence that
the results were not intended by a majority of legislators. It is to this
argument that I now turn.
The newer version of the BA rests on the premise that any part of a
statute-but particularly an odd or incongruous part-may be the result of
legislative compromise. As Manning has argued, "because a statute's
apparently odd contours may reflect unknowable compromises or
legislators' behind-the-scenes strategic maneuvers, judges can rarely, if
ever, tell if a law's specific wording is unintentionally imprecise or was
instead crafted to navigate the complex legislative process.
Or, as
Justice Thomas, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, put it: A
statute's "delicate crafting [may] reflect[] a compromise amidst highly
4
interested parties attempting to pull the provisions in different directions."'
It is important for the BA that any legislative compromise could
always have played a decisive role in the success of legislation-that the
41
statute would not have passed without it.
But textualists argue that there

35. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning,42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 335 (1990).
36.

United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 298 (1970).

37. Id.
38. The concept of "congressional intent" is a something of a theoretical thicket. I assume
for this article that at a minimum it is possible to conceptualize a fictional congressional intent by
treating statutes as the product of a fictional "single author": Congress. I recognize that this
conception requires a theoretical defense but will not pursue this defense here.
39. Manning, Absurdity, supra note 10, at 2395.
By "behind-the-scenes strategic
maneuvers," Manning appears to be referring to what is essentially an anticipatory compromiseselecting particular statuory language in order to ensure passage of the legislation.
40. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002).
41. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2016
(2009) ("[R]eliance on purpose threatens to upset necessary legislative compromises because it
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is no point in trying to engage in an empirical investigation of whether a
because "[this] question is simply
particular compromise was' decisive,
2
A
fact.
the
after
unanswerable
Thus, it is never possible for courts to know which straw might have
broken the camel's back. Where competing interests are at stake, "a
change in any individual provision could... unravel[] the whole. 43
Judges cannot answer the question of "whether the legislature-constrained
that
by the legislative process-would have been able to agree on wording
44
would include or exclude [a] troubling application or omission."
In sum, textualists argue that the legislative process leaves two related
"unanswerable" questions about the enacted text: (1) Was the text a product
of a legislative bargain among competing interests; and: (2) Was the
particular wording of the text essential to its enactment. The two questions
are connected, but they have a distinct relevance. For example, the first
point entails that we should care about preserving legislative bargains even
if they were not essential to enactment. Legislative expertise and the
legislator's role in representing her constituents-including interest groups
that may lobby for changes in the text-provide sufficient reason to respect
a compromise even when the legislation would have passed without it.
Conversely, the particular wording of the text may have been essential to
its passage even if it was not the result of a direct compromise. One could
imagine a legislator inserting certain language into a bill in order to
preempt concerns from another legislator or an outside interest group, even
if that party did not actually participate in drafting the law. The upshot of
this discussion is that textualism considers both the nature of the legislative
process and the intent of individual legislators to be unknowable.
III. The Constitutional Dimension of Legislative Compromise
The formalist version of the BA is not based on considerations of what
interpretive method is most likely to capture "congressional intent,"
however conceived. Instead, it is based on constitutional necessity of
preserving legislative compromise. Manning's basic claim is that the
textualist approach is most faithful to the constitutional design because it
furthers the Framers' intent to give legislative minorities the right to insist

arbitrarily shifts the level of generality at which the lawmakers have expressed their policy.")
(emphasis added).
42. Manning, Absurdity, supra note 10, at 2410.
43.
44.

Barnhart,534 U.S. at 461.
Manning, Absurdity, supra note 10, at 2409-10.
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45

upon compromise as "the price of assent.,
The key constitutional
provision for the BA is the bicameralism and presentment clause of Article
I, Section 7 ("bicameralism").46
A.

The Early Formalist Argument

Textualists' reliance on bicameralism is not a recent development.
Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook, among others, have argued for more
than two decades that relying on legislative history to determine
congressional intent violates the constitutionally prescribed lawmaking
process of bicameralism. 47 They claim that, because only the enacted text
of the law has been approved by both chambers and presented to the
President, nothing else may serve as a valid expression of Congress's
intent.48 At bottom this argument reflects two concerns.
The first is with the unreliability of expressions of intent that have not
gone through the bicameralism process. This concern relates to the issue of
the "opacity" of legislators' intentions, discussed above. The textualist
position is that the most reliable way to know what all of the legislators
who passed the bill intended is to look at what the text says. By contrast,
external sources of intent, such as legislative history, may reflect the views
of only some members, or even mere political posturing.
The second concern is with the illegitimacy of nontextual sources of
intent; that it is unconstitutional-and undemocratic-to give voice to
nontextual indicators or intent that have not undergone the careful process
that the Constitution has prescribed in order to ensure adequate deliberation
and representation. Only the text is law.
As framed in these early arguments, textualism's reliance on
bicameralism was flawed, or at least incomplete. 49 On the issue of
reliability, Manning notes that the Supreme Court has moved away toward
an "equilibrium" that has pared back the excesses of prior, indiscriminate
use of legislative history, while "ultimately conclud[ing] that no one has
made the case for the inherent unreliability of such materials in all
contexts., 50 The question of reliability is ultimately empirical in nature45. John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1314 (2010)
[hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation].
46.
47.

See Manning, Equity, supra note 8, at 70-79.
Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 45, at 1292 & n.28.

48. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
49. I emphasize that I am not suggesting that a strong empirical or pragmatic argument for
textualism cannot be made. This Article is only directed to the leading theory of textualism,
which is formalistic.
50. Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 45, at 1308.
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either legislative history represents what a majority of Congress believes
about the purposes and/or intended effects of a statute, or it does not.
For a committed textualist, the illegitimacy aspect of non-statutory
sources appears to provide firmer ground to assert that such sources are
inherently suspect, at least when such sources come into conflict with the
plain text. But the illegitimacy argument in its conventional form also
suffers from serious flaws.
First, bicameralism alone does not by itself provide sufficient reason
to disregard extratextual sources or background statutory purposes.
Manning has framed the issue clearly:
Textualists often rely on the formal claim that
bicameralism and presentment mandate textualism because
the enacted text alone has survived the legislative process
requirement of Article I, Section 7. In formal terms,
however, invoking the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment provides us merely with a rule of recognition,
telling us only which texts to interpret as enacted law. The
process alone does not tell us how to interpret the law thus
enacted ....
If textualists object to using background
statutory purpose to shift the level of generality of one or
more clear and specific statutory provisions, then the basis
of that objection must come from beyond the formal
requirements of Article I, Section 7.51
In other words, based solely on the process of bicameralism, it cannot be
inherently illegitimate for judges to use a nontextualist approach to
interpretation, so long as judges interpret the enacted text and not
something else.
There will be some cases where consultation of
extratextual sources may shed more light on how a statutory provision was
designed to operate than the bare text alone.
Manning goes on to argue that much of the evidence concerning "the
purposes implicit in bicameralism. . . speaks inconclusively as to the
appropriate interpretive method., 52 "Although such considerations might
reasonably suggest that judges should scrupulously enforce the precise
outcomes of this carefully designed deliberative process, the same
considerations might also support interpretive rules designed to reinforce
the underlying values that the process seeks to advance." 53 Manning is
51.
52.

Manning, Equity, supra note 8, at 70-71.
Id. at 72.

53.

Id. at 74.
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admirably forthright about the crossroads that bicameralism presents.
Arriving at these crossroads, judges who think that the question of whether
the Constitution assigns an "appropriate interpretive method" is itself
"unanswerable" may be tempted to look in other directions-such as
politics, tradition, and pragmatism-for guidance as to what method to use.
Manning, however, believes there is a concrete constitutional answer
to the question of interpretive method: this answer is expressed in his
version of the BA.
B.

The Argument from Structural Inferences

The newer version of the BA is a more complex constitutional
argument. It starts from the premise that the protection of minority rights
through the legislative process is a central objective of the Constitution. It
may seem odd for a foundational defense of textualism to begin with an
ostensibly purposivist claim about the Framers' objectives and general
intentions. But this approach is not actually at odds with textualist
methodology. Manning has written that constitutional textualism "entails
recovering or reconstructing the historically situated meaning of the
constitutional text., 54 As noted above, textualism allows policy context to
illuminate-though never contradict-ambiguous terms in the plain text.
What is more, Manning has argued that the BA applies with equal force to
constitutional interpretation, at least where separation of powers is
concerned, because in dividing powers, the Framers "struck a balance"
between competing purposes and interest groups. 55 He argues that, "every
56
detail of the American separation of powers had to be bargained for.",
Instead of broad, freestanding principals like separation of powers or
federalism, 57 Manning favors "clause-centered methods of textual
interpretation. 8 One of these methods is to make "structural inferences"
text "by considering
about the meaning of a "semantically indeterminate"
59
how it fits within the context of related provisions."
The textual hook for the BA is the phrase "the judicial Power," from
sections 1 and 2 of Article III. While the Constitution clearly authorizes
courts to interpret federal law, it does not specify how. It does not tell us
what approach to statutory interpretation to use. Manning therefore claims

54. Manning, Separationof Powers as OrdinaryInterpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939,
1975 (2011) [hereinafter Manning, Separation].
55.

Id. at 1978-89.

56. Id. at 1978.
57.

Id. at 2038.

58.

Id. at 1949.

59. Id. at 2034.
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that the phrase is "semantically indeterminate"
and requires structural
6
inferences to determine its precise meaning. 0
At this point, one might wonder why one would think the Constitution
contains an affirmative answer to the question of how to interpret laws;
why it would implicitly require one method of interpretation rather than
doing so explicitly. More on this later. For now, suffice it to say that the
answer brings us back to Manning's approach of constitutional
interpretation-a theory favored by textualists generally-that we should
seek to recover the historically situated meaning of the text. How should
we recover the meaning of "the judicial power"? One way would be to
consult the historical context of the drafting of the Constitution, as well as
early understandings of the Vesting Clause in the nation's early history.
This is the approach taken by William Eskridge. Eskridge argues that
"judicial power" was not originally understood to entail a technical
approach to statutory interpretation akin to modem textualism, and that, for
early judges like John Marshall, judging was more of an art than a science.
Early American judges gave heavy weight to the plain text but also took
into account "legal and sometimes political context.",6 ' Eskridge also
consults the analogous "legislative history" from the ratification of the
Constitution and concludes that the ratification debates suggest that the
Framers likely believed the federal courts could prioritize principles of
equity over the text at least in some instances.6 2 The general impression
from Eskridge's analysis is that the Framers did not intend the phrase
"judicial power" to implicitly prescribe any particular interpretive
approach.
Manning concedes that "those who participated in the ratification
debates were not of one mind on the subject" of how courts should interpret
statutes.63
He also acknowledges that "the pre-Marshall Court
jurisprudence is largely inconclusive" on the subject. 64 He therefore looks
to the structure of the Constitution for insight as to whether the "judicial
power" contains a prescription for textualism.
1. Bicameralism and Presentment Clause and Article V
The primary constitutional support for the BA comes from two parts
of the document: the bicameralism process laid out in Article I, Section 7,
and Article V's exception to the constitutional amendment process for
60. Id.
61. Eskridge, AllAbout Words, supra note 31, at 1086.
62. Id at 1040.
63. Manning, Equity, supranote 8, at 84 & n.33.
64. Id at 87.
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states' "equal suffrage in the Senate." Manning argues that, taken together,
these provisions decisively manifest a "structural policy" of protecting
minorities against "majority oppression., 65 Specifically, bicameralism sets
up a de facto "supermajority" requirement for the passage of legislation.66
Small states and other minority interests are the special beneficiaries of
bicameralism because of the composition of the Senate. Therefore, "the
legislative process is designed to give minorities an exaggerated
right to
67
insist upon legislative compromise as the price of assent."
This inference aligns with the federalist concerns of the Framers. In
particular, that the interests of small states and other political minorities
must be protected under the constitutional system. According to Manning,
further evidence of this intent is found in the fact that "the states' equal
representation in the Senate ...is the one part of the [constitutional] design
68
that Article V purports to place even beyond the amendment process."
The conclusion of this line of argument is that: "Interpreting statutes to be
more coherent and just expressions of legislative purpose, then, risks
evasion of a constitutionally ordained purpose-to give minorities a
disproportionate say in the legislative process."
2.

Necessary andProperClause

In recent scholarship, Manning advocates for the Necessary and
Proper Clause as an additional pillar of support. Specifically, he argues
that the discretion to determine what is "necessary" and "proper" to
69
implement the Constitution's powers belongs to Congress, not the courts.
Because the Constitution vests this discretion with Congress, courts should
apply Chevron-like deference to Congress's implementation of its
constitutional powers.
As Manning frames it, Congress's "implementation power" is the
power to choose the "necessary and proper" means for implementing the
Constitution. He argues that this power has specific implications for
statutory interpretation. The argument proceeds as follows: The Necessary
and Proper Clause gives Congress the discretion to prescribe the means of
constitutional power. 70 Among those powers is the power to make laws
65.

Id.at 70-71.

66.
67.

Id.at 75-76.
Id.at 77-78.

68. Id.at 76.
69. See Manning, ConstitutionalPower, supra note 9, at 65 ("By analogy, the Necessary
and Proper Clause is a constitutional grant to Congress of implementational rulemaking
authority.").
70. See generally id.Manning spends eighty-four pages articulating the argument for this
proposition, so I will not attempt to summarize it here.
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concerning subjects enumerated in Article I, which provides Congress the
express authority to set federal policy through "statutory means. ' 7' But the
Necessary and Proper Clause further broadens Congress's lawmaking
powers. Whereas Article I provides the power to make laws, the Necessary
and Proper Clause provides Congress with the discretion to write them in
the manner it sees fit. As relevant here, the clause implicitly gives
Congress the power "to write incoherent, overbroad, or incomplete
legislation," if it wishes to, particularly for the purpose of enshrining
72
legislative compromise.
This part of Manning's Necessary and Proper Clause argument, as it
relates to statutory interpretation, is really a counterargument to strong
purposivism. Manning believes that "purposivism's true grounding [is] in
structural constitutional assumptions., 73 Purposivists, he argues, think that:
"If the details of statutory meaning do not advance the [statute's]
underlying policy, it furthers the constitutionalpolicymaking function of
Congress, properly conceived, for the Court itself to substitute new means
that achieve the desired end." 74 The primary purposivist "assumption"
Manning seems to be referring to is that courts can-and should-help
Congress exercise its Article I powers by interpreting laws in a way that
75
makes the law "more coherent with its apparent background policy.
Under this assumption, courts are like the apprentices who add the
finishing touches and blot out any obvious errors to the master's painting.
To which the textualist responds: maybe the master left the painting
unfinished for a reason. And maybe that apparent "error" is no error at all,
but a carefully crafted compromise. Because Congress has broad power
not only to make policy, but also to make incoherent or incomplete policy,
courts should not undermine Congress's ability to do so by smoothing out
rough edges or filling in gaps that may have been intentional. Otherwise,
Congress will not be able to draft those gaps and rough spots with
precision, or to accommodate legislative bargaining that furthers minority
power.
Manning's Necessary and Proper Clause argument is largely
subsidiary to his bicameralism/minority rights argument. 7 The Necessary
and Proper Clause does not directly support textualism unless there is some

71.

Id at 20.

72.

Id.

73.
74.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 20 (emphasis added).

75. Id.
76. Id. at 76 (implying that "the aim of the Court's textualism" should be "to facilitate
precise legislative communication").
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prior reason for courts to presume that awkwardness or incoherence in the
text is intentional. Otherwise, this argument simply begs the question
whether Congress has actually "chosen" statutory means that are
"incoherent, overbroad, or incomplete," 7 or whether these features are
inadvertent and perhaps undesirable from the perspective of the legislators
who voted for it.
This is why the point about "precision" is so important. The
Necessary and Proper Clause, in Manning's view, creates another narrow
"structural inference" concerning how statutes should be interpreted. The
inference is: because the clause gives Congress such broad power to craft
laws that define the contours of the Constitution, it is appropriate that
Congress should have the broadest available tools for the doing so. One of
these tools is to draft statutes that "adopt an odd, half-a-loaf
compromise." 78 But if Congress sands down the rough edges of
compromise, Congress's power to memorialize the compromise in the text
will be diminished, and one of its most powerful tools will have been taken
away by the judiciary.
IV. The Constitution and Hidden Compromise
To sum up: According to Manning, the process of bicameralism, its de
facto "supermajority requirement," and the allocation of outsized power to
political minorities in places like Article V's placement of equal Senate
suffrage beyond the amendment process, are all textual indications that the
Framers prioritized the right of political minorities to insist upon
compromise as the price of assent. Because textualism seeks to preserve
legislative compromise to the maximum extent, we should interpret "the
judicial power" as conferring upon courts only the power to apply the plain
text of the statute (read in its semantic context), even when a textual
provision appears starkly at odds with the statute's apparent purpose(s).
What is more, the broad implementation power that the Necessary and
Proper Clause gives to Congress provides an additional indication that,
where Congress chooses half measures to address a problem, the Framers
intended that this choice be respected.
Much of this argument is relatively uncontroversial. Most judges and
constitutional scholars would probably agree that if members Congress
settled on an awkward compromise in a statute in order to get the
legislation passed, courts should respect this compromise, even if it
77. See id. at 20 (arguing that purposivism makes it "harder for Congress to exercise its
,necessary and proper' power to choose statutory means-and in particular, to write incoherent,
overbroad, or incomplete legislation") (emphasis added).
78.

Id. at21.
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undermines the professed goals of the legislation. Allowing judges to
improve upon statutes without regard for the constitutionally sanctioned
recipe for confusion, arbitrariness, and
process for passing legislation is a 79
lawmaking.
judicial
anti-democratic
But the BA makes two related assumptions that are not as intuitive.
First, textualists assume that all compromises are created equal and that
backroom deals deserve the same protection from judges as bargaining in
plain view. Second, textualists seem to insist that compromises must be
respected to the maximum extent possible.
A.

Two Kinds of Compromise

There are two ways to arrive at a compromise over the meaning of a
statutory provision. The first is to do so openly, either by making the
bargaining process visible to the public or by informing the public of the
existence or outcome of closed-door negotiations. An open compromise
can also be apparent from various sources, including legislative history and
the different versions that a bill has gone through to reach its final form.
The second method is to horse trade behind closed doors, such that the
existence of the compromise is never known.
The difference between these two kinds of compromise is a matter of
degree. At one end of the spectrum are bargains that remain completely
hidden--the public has no way of knowing that a compromise was ever
reached regarding the issue. (If in fact a deliberate compromise was
reached over the phrase "established by the State" in the ACA, it was
completely hidden). On the other end of the spectrum are compromises of
which the public is fully informed. For example, King would have been a
case about open compromise had the legislative history to the ACA
indicated that lawmakers agreed the phrase "established by the State"
would be used to exclude federally established exchanges from subsidies.
(But, of course, the legislative history did not provide any such indication.)
Furthermore, as explained below, there are gray areas between "fully open"
and "fully hidden," for example, where we know that a particular provision
was the focus of compromise but do not know exactly why it was written
the way it was. Nonetheless, for ease of exposition, I treat the issue as a
binary one.

79.

Cf 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND tN FOUR

BOOKS 91 (1st ed. 1765) ("[Ilf the parliament willpositively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it: and the examples usually alleged in support
of this sense of the rule do none of them prove, that where the main object of a statute is
unreasonable the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that were to set the judicial power above that
of the legislature, which would be subversive of all government.") (emphasis added).
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Open Compromise

There are numerous cases where the Supreme Court has weighed the
importance of open compromise. I will highlight three here.
The first example is of a compromise evidenced by different iterations
of a bill that was shaped by pressure from outside interest groups. The
Court recently took into account such compromise in Jones v. Harris
Associates L.P. 80 In Jones, the Court considered a provision of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 that imposed a "fiduciary duty" on
investment advisors "with respect to compensation received from a mutual
fund."81 The Court noted that the statute's fiduciary duty standard was the
product of a "delicate compromise. 8 2 This was not mere speculation. The
Court described how Congress initially considered a remedy that would
allow the SEC to challenge compensation that was not "reasonable. 8 3
Language to this effect was proposed in the House of Representatives, but
it was ultimately rejected after industry representatives objected. 84 In
analyzing the meaning of "fiduciary duty" in the Act, the Court relied upon
Congress' rejection, under pressure from interest groups, of the
"reasonableness" standard.
The Court believed that this apparent
compromise weighed against interpretations of the Act that would result in
"judicial second-guessing of informed [mutual fund company] board
decisions. ''8 5
The second example concerns an interbranch compromise documented
in the House Reports. In Block v. N. Dakota ex rel. Board of University &
School Lands, the Supreme Court relied on evidence of an open
compromise to reject a plausible interpretation.86 The Court considered
whether the statute of limitations of the Quiet Title Act of 1972 ("QTA"),
which waived sovereign immunity as to certain title claims, applied to
North Dakota as a separate sovereign. 87 North Dakota argued that, even if
the statute of limitations applied, it could still sue the federal government
under an officer-suit theory. 88 Addressing the officer-suit theory, the Court
looked to legislative history, which revealed that the twelve-year statute of
limitations was a hard-fought compromise between Congress and the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010).
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 352.
Block v. N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
Id.
at 275-77, 290.
Id. at 280.
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Executive Branch. 89 In particular, Congress arrived at the twelve-year
figure as part of a bargain to eliminate a grandfather clause in the final
bill. 9° In rejecting the state's theory, the Court reasoned: "if North
Dakota's position were correct, all of the carefully-crafted provisions of the
QTA deemed necessary for the protection of the national public interest
could be averted." 91
Block also relied on this history of compromise to reject the argument
that the QTA's statute of limitations did not apply to states. The Court first
noted that the literal text did not support North Dakota's position. 92 Under
the older plain meaning school of interpretation, this would likely be the
end of the story, and the state would lose. But, textualism takes into
account the "semantic context" of legislation, including any applicable
canons of construction. In Block, North Dakota argued that "precedence
should be given to the. .. canon of statutory construction that statutes of
limitations should not apply to the States absent express legislative
inclusion." 93 While acknowledging that this canon might otherwise be
applicable, the Court rejected it in light of the specific evidence
of an open
94
Branch.
Executive
the
and
Congress
between
compromise
In the third example, the Court considered evidence that a compromise
occurred, even where the specific details were never disclosed. (This
circumstance falls somewhere in the gray area between fully open or
hidden compromise.) In Stewart v. Abend, the Court took up a provision of
the Copyright Act of 1909 that was drafted in a series of negotiations over
"controversial and intertwined issues" between interested parties including
"authors, composers, book and music publishers, and motion picture
studios ...

The negotiations were successful, but, perhaps as a

byproduct of this success, lawmakers did not feel the need to elaborate on
what the compromise language meant. Nonetheless, in light of evidence of
collaborative drafting of the provision by competing interest groups, the
Court concluded that it should adhere closely to the literal language of the
statute. The Court reasoned that "[t]he process of compromise between
competing special interests leading to the enactment of the 1976 Act

89.
90.

Id. at 284.
Id.

91.
92.
93.

Id.at284-85.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 288.

94.

Id. at 290.

95. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 225-26 (1990) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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undermines any such attempt to draw an overarching policy out of' the
contested provision.96
As these examples illustrate, compromise is not necessarily invisible.
An open compromise may be shown in various ways, including
comparisons of different drafts of legislation, as in Jones; statements or
documents in congressional reports, as in Block; and specific evidence
about the drafting process, as in Stewart. There is no "hierarchy" among
these different forms of evidence, or indeed between different types of
compromise in general. A compromise between legislators is neither
superior nor inferior to a compromise between interest groups that is
approved by legislators. At bottom, evidence of compromise is simply
evidence of intent. Where the Court has been presented with such evidence
it has not hesitated to rely on it. Nonetheless, as textualists forcefully
emphasize, some, and probably most, legislative compromise remains
invisible, with no evidence to show if and how it occurred.
2.

Hidden Compromise

By "hidden compromise" I mean a textual concession to or
triangulation between one or more interest groups, including lawmakers,
the nature of which is invisible, and generally unknowable, to the general
public and by extension to courts. I include within this definition a
compromise that one might expect to have taken place given how the
legislative process works in general, or given the controversial nature of a
law, but about which nothing specific is known. In almost any major
legislation, one can expect the wording of the law in various places to be
the product of negotiations among lawmakers or lobbying from special
interest groups. For example, if an early version of a bill provokes an
outcry from an influential interest group, and that group later drops its
objection to a dramatically altered version of the legislation, one might
safely assume that some kind of compromise went on behind the scenes.
Part of the compromise may be "visible," as in cases where a controversial
provision is dropped from the statute. But, particularly in complex "horsetrading" situations, it may be impossible to discern where in the legislation
any compromise occurred.97
Thus, judges cannot "discover" hidden compromise. As I am defining
it here, there is nothing to discover; if the existence of compromise could
be inferred from evidence inside or outside the text, it would be an open
96. Id.
97. Contrast Block v. North Dakota ex tel., 461 U.S. 273, 284 (1983), described above, in
which the Supreme Court considered specific public evidence that the drafting of the relevant
provision was the result of a compromise between different branches of the government.
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compromise. The only way to account for hidden compromise in the
interpretive process is to presume its existence. Such a presumption
requires normative justification.
There are at least two types of hidden compromise. One type is
inherently invisible, and the other tends to be invisible because relevant
actors choose to keep it that way.
The first type, "preemptive
compromise," was alluded to above. Preemptive compromise is a onesided concession that a legislative actor makes in order to avoid
controversy, blowback from special interest groups, or the costly
bargaining process itself. For example, a legislator trying to craft a gun
control bill might unilaterally include an incongruous exemption in the text,
which does not serve and may significantly undermine the statute's
purposes, simply because she does not want to risk the ire of the powerful
National Rifle Association and its members. Another, perhaps even more
common, occurrence is the use of deliberate ambiguity in drafting to avoid
conflict over the details. 98 This, too, is a form of compromise designed at
heading off a political impasse. Such preemptive compromise, particularly
if made by one legislative actor, will typically be inherently invisible,
because there is no specific evidence for the compromise unless the actor
chooses to reveal the influence that such considerations had on the drafting
process.
The second type of hidden compromise is epitomized by the
"backroom deal." Many Americans might consider such deals to be a
blemish on the democratic process. They symbolize (in some quarters) the
outsized influence that special interests have on the legislative process,
particularly when these interests have campaign money to leverage. But
for textualists who subscribe to the BA, backroom deals are a fundamental
aspect of democracy that must be protected.
The leading Supreme Court authority concerning hidden compromise
is Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., with Justice Thomas writing for a sixjustice majority. 99 The facts of the case were as follows: In 1992, Congress

passed the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (Coal Act). One of the
problems the Act was designed to address was the allocation of health
benefits for retired coal workers whose employers had left the industry.
The Court noted that "the Coal Act was passed amidst a maelstrom of
contract negotiations, litigation, strike threats, a presidential veto of the first
version of the bill and threats of a second veto, and high pressure lobbying,
98. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 596-97, 602, 615 (2002) (providing strong
anecdotal evidence for deliberate ambiguity in drafting).
99. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002).
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not to mention wide disagreements among Members of Congress."' ° The
statute assigned benefits obligations to two types of companies: "signatory
operators" that had already agreed to pay benefits under earlier collective
bargaining agreements, and "related persons"-companies with a close
corporate connection to signatory operators. The statute specified that
successors in interest to "related persons" must contribute benefits, but it
did not include a parallel provision for successors in interest to the
signatory operators themselves.'01
Jericol was the successor in interest to a signatory operator, and
10 2
Sigmon Coal was "related person" to Jericol (collectively, "Sigmon").
The Commissioner of Social Security concluded that Sigmon was liable for
contributions for retirees of Jericol. But the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the statute unambiguously exempted successors in interest of
signatory operators from contributions, even though successors in interest
of related persons--whose relationship with beneficiaries is more
attenuated-are liable under similar circumstances.
Congress's stated intent in passing the Coal Act was to "identify
persons most responsible for plan liabilities"' 10 3 The Court nonetheless
refused to import successor in interest liability for signatory operators into
the statute based on this express purpose. The Court noted that the Act's
"delicate crafting reflected a compromise amidst highly interested parties
attempting to pull the provisions in different directions." "[N]egotiations
surrounding enactment of this bill tell a typical story of legislative battle
among interest groups," and "[t]he deals brokered during a Committee
markup, on the floor of the two Houses, during a joint House and Senate
Conference, or in negotiations with the President are not for us to judge or
second-guess."' 104

The Court in Sigmon did not have evidence of a deal struck over the
specific statutory provision at issue. 10 5 But the Court inferred that some
kind of deal could have taken place simply because of the controversial
nature of the legislation. 0 6 ' Therefore, the Court relied on "hidden
compromise" to reject an opposing interpretation of the statute that was
100.

Id at 442-47.

See id. at 450-51 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a) (1994 ed.)).
Id.at 447-49, 448 n. II.
103. Id.at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Pub. L. 102-486, § 19142,
106 Stat. 3037).
101.
102.

104. Id.at460-61.
105. See id.at 460-62. The Court did cite general legislative history showing that the bill's
"crafting," in general, "reflected a compromise amidst highly interested parties attempting to pull
the provisions in different directions." Id.at 461 (citing 6 Legislative History 4569-4571).
106. See id.at 460-62.
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informed by statutory purposes, legislative history, and common sense.
Notably, the Court did not mention the possibility of preemptive
compromise, but there is no reason to think that such compromise would be
any less deserving of judicial respect under the BA.
Barnhart is the leading case, but the Court's most far-reaching
statement about hidden compromise is found in Ragsdale v. Wolverine
World Wide, Inc.10 7 There, Justice Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority,
suggested in dictum that "any key term in an important piece of legislation"
is the result of compromise.' 08 The compromise Justice Kennedy was
referring to in Ragsdale was at least partly open, as evidenced by the
legislative history. 10 9 But Ragsdale illustrates a recent trend in textualism
toward a general presumption that awkward or incoherent statutory
provisions are the result of compromise.
Among individual judges, Justice Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook
were early proponents of preserving hidden compromise. Justice Scalia has
argued that "[lt]he final form of a statute, especially in regulated fields ... is
often the result of compromise among various interest groups, resulting in a
decision to go so far and not farther." 110 He wrote: "The problem with
judicial intuition of a public policy that goes beyond the actual prohibitions
of the law is that there is no way of knowing whether the apparent gaps in
the law are intentional or inadvertent." 1 1 Like Justice Kennedy's statement
in Ragsdale, Justice Scalia relies on assumptions about how legislation is
Similarly, Judge
drafted to support a presumption of compromise.
Easterbrook has written that "[1]egislation reflects compromise among
competing interests[,]" and so "[ilt upsets the legislative balance to push
the outcome [of a conflict between interest groups] farther in either
direction."' 12
B.

Bases for a Presumption of Compromise

The primary distinction between the new textualism of proponents like
Scalia, Easterbrook and Manning, on the one hand, and the soft
purposivism of judges like John Paul Stevens and Steven Breyer, on the
other, is the strong blanket presumption of hidden compromise described in

107. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002).
108. Id.at 93-94 (emphasis added).
109. Id.at 94 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-135, at 37 (1991)).
110. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 68-69
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Id.at 68 (emphasis added).
112.

Heath v. Varity Corp., 71 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1995).
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13
the preceding section, which textualists employ but purposivists do not."
One reason for importing such a presumption is suggested by Justice
Kennedy's dictum in Ragsdale that key provisions in important legislation
are likely to be the result of compromise. This is an empirical assumption
about the legislative process. The same assumption is also embodied in
Justice Scalia's assertion that statutes are "often the result of a compromise
among various interest groups."
This empirical basis for the BA aims at capturing the actual intent of
the majority of legislators, and presuming that this intent was to
compromise. But there are several pitfalls to this approach, which suggest
that the empirical basis is more likely than not wrong. (At least without
hard empirical evidence to the contrary.)
First, even if hidden compromise occurred, there is no reason to think
that the entire legislature, or even a majority of those voting in favor, was
aware of it. One can of course imagine a large "backroom deal" involving
most of Congress, of which only the American public is unaware, but this
scenario seems far-fetched. It is much more likely that a particular bargain
would be of interest only to a select few lawmakers, or even just a single
lawmaker. It is possible, as textualists assert, that the legislation would not
have passed without the compromise. But it is also possible that the
legislation would not have passed if all legislators were aware of the
compromise.
Second, the size and complexity of modem legislation means that
some instances of sloppy drafting are likely to go unnoticed by lawmakers
until discovered by a clever litigant later. Barnhart is an example. The
summary given above does not adequately capture the complexity of the
Coal Act, with its complicated relationships between beneficiaries,
signatory operators, and related persons. It is easy to imagine that even
diligent and conscientious legislators could have overlooked the textual gap
in liability for successors of signatory operators. The Affordable Care Act
is another good example. It should be quite obvious to anyone who
followed the extremely contentious public debate over the law that a great
many, if not a full majority, of the legislators who voted for the law would
not have thought that coverage purchased on federally established
exchanges would be excluded from tax subsidies, as these subsidies go to
the very heart of how the law is supposed to work.
Third, recent evidence suggests that the empirical basis for the BA
relies on flawed assumptions about how the legislative drafting process
works. In particular, a detailed study of the process by Professors Abbe

113. See John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2009 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, Competing Presumptions].
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Gluck and Lisa Bressman suggests that the drafting of bills in the House of
Representatives is carried out in large part by a nonpartisan House entity,
the Office of Legislative Counsel.' 14 This evidence undermines the
argument that small, subtle instances of statutory incoherence are the likely
result of precise drafting by legislators.
Gluck and Bressman have also presented evidence that members of
Congress more often learn about the legislation from legislative history
than from reading the actual text.' 15 Their work corroborates anecdotal
evidence, and common sense, suggesting that members of Congress do not
have the time or resources to analyze bills in their entirety, particularly
given the size of many statutes and the heavy congressional workload.
(Note that I used "analyze" rather than "read"-for a lawmaker to actually
discover inadvertent oversights or errors usually requires more than simply
reading a law from front to back. Instead, it often requires the kind of
complex legal analysis that can take sophisticated legal actors months to
unearth and to brief). Taking the Affordable Care Act as an example, it is
clear-and, from the perspective of some, notorious-that many if not
most lawmakers never read the final bill before it was enacted. For
example, House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers, a prominent
supporter of the ACA, said: "What good is reading the bill if it's a thousand
pages and you don't have two days and two lawyers to find out what it
'
means after you read the bill?"116
A fourth pitfall is that, to be as consistent and precise as possible, the
empirical approach could not simply rely on a blanket presumption of
compromise. As the quotes from Justices Kennedy and Scalia above
suggest, judges seeking to faithfully apply the empirical approach would
have to consider a variety of subsidiary factors bearing on the question of
compromise versus inadvertence. Such factors include whether a particular
provision was "key" to the passage of the legislation, the degree of
contentiousness in the enactment process, whether the legislation concerns
a highly regulated field, and so on. There is no reason to think judges
would be able to accurately synthesize and evaluate all of the relevant
factors, and therefore no firm basis for asserting that this empirical inquiry

114. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretationfrom the Inside-An
Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part11, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 725, 740-41(2014).
115. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretationfrom the Inside-An
Empirical Study of CongressionalDrafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 968-69 (2013).
116. Victoria McGrane, Read the Bill? It Might Not Help, POLITICO (Sept. 8, 2009, 4:24
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/26846.html.
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would bring us closer to "actual" legislative intent than a more purposivist
approach.
Manning is well aware of these difficulties. Accordingly, he has
written that, at present, there is no:
empirical basis for concluding in any given case that
awkwardness in a statute's means/ends fit is reliably
traceable to either mistaken legislative expression or
unrecorded compromise. Accordingly, equating respect
for Congress with one presumption or the other ultimately
must depend on identifying some systemic, normatively
rooted premise that ultimately derives from the
117
constitutional structure.
This takes us back to the constitutional foundations of the BA, described
above. Manning argues for a presumption of compromise based on the
text-based structural inferences from the Constitution, which argue for
of compromise in the
courts to be "respectful of the central place
11 8
constitutional design of the legislative process."
C.

The Maximalist Position

The BA assumes a "maximalist position" with regard to legislative
compromise. The maximalist position holds that the Constitution should be
read as requiring that compromise be preserved to the greatest extent
possible, or nearly so. It does not matter if the compromise is visible or
Because the Constitution's express
invisible, concrete or speculative.
lawmaking provisions give political minorities outsized power to insist
upon compromise, we should infer from this structural policy that the
compromises demanded by political minorities should be enforced by
courts in almost all possible instances. To enforce compromise to the
maximum extent possible means that courts must enforce hidden
Because hidden compromises are by their nature
compromise.
unknowable, courts must find a way to enforce them without knowing they
are there. The only way to do this is to follow the ordinary semantic
meaning of the plain text.
The BA adds a new twist to the widely held textualist view of why
clear semantic meaning should be dispositive. The traditional argument
relies on the notion, informed by public choice theory, that there is no

117.
118.

Manning, Competing Presumptions, supra note 113, at 2011.
Id.
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unified legislative intent outside of the text. There is no "meeting of the
minds" among legislators except for the final product of the process. What
the BA adds to this conventional view is a conception of the plain language
as a necessary "tool" for securing particular outcomes sought by interest
groups.
According to Manning, the plain text is not merely the only viable
expression of Congressional intent, but it is also the only viable tool for
enacting precise compromises that may over or under enforce the purposes
of the legislation. He has written that, "[i]f the Court presumes that
awkward statutory outcomes typically reflect mistaken expression, then
legislators cannot reliably use the only effective tool at their disposal--the
phrasing of a statutory command-to express limits upon the legislative
policy to which they are willing to assent.""1 9
Under this view, it is important that minorities be able to rely on
courts reading statutes in a highly predictable manner. Indeed, Manning
suggests that the capacity for political minorities to effectively use precise
language depends on courts' adoption of textualist methodology. Because
textualism adheres to "semantic meaning" as the relevant linguistic
community would understand it, legislative bargainers have an easy way to
predict how textualist judges will predict statutory language: One must
simply be familiar with the linguistic conventions of the legal community.
If all judges become textualists, following the same familiar canons of
statutory interpretation, it will be possible to embed very precise
compromises within the text.
This conception of plain language as a tool for ensuring desired results
bargained for by interest groups helps explain why, for the BA, it makes no
difference whether an awkward provision was actually the result of
compromise. What matters is that drafters have the most precise tools
possible to put their intentions into words, and that, having done so, the
intended meaning is not undone by judicial interpretation. 20 According to
the theory, the judicial practice of imposing additional coherence on an
unclear or poorly drafted text actually deprives drafters of the power to
produce incoherent results as a means of securing assent from political
minorities.

119. Id.
120. Of course, textualists of all stripes have often argued that adherence to semantic
meaning (however conceived) permits more precise and predictable drafting. But the BA
includes an additional premise: That precise drafting tools are necessary for legislative
compromise to be enforced by courts, as required by the Constitution. The BA shifts the grounds
of debate from what is good judicial policy to what is required under the best interpretation of the
Constitution.
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Following this constitutional argument to its endpoint, textualists
conclude that hidden backroom deals deserve the same respect from courts
as open compromises. The upshot is a strong, general presumption of
compromise when the clear, plain, or literal text leads to statutory
incoherence. Put simply, the maximalist position holds that it is better for
courts to enforce the plain text according to predictable interpretive rules
than it is to try to aid Congress by correcting apparent drafting errors.
Obviously, this position means that when judges are confronted with
statutory incoherence, they will sometimes have to enforce results that a
legislative majority would not have intended. But, for textualism, these
undesired outcomes are the lesser of two evils. The greater evil is to depart
from the Constitution's (inferred) command to respect the right of
legislative minorities to insist upon compromise, whether in backrooms or
out in the open
V. The Bargaining Argument in the Roberts Court
This section highlights the strong and seemingly growing influence
the BA has had in the Roberts Court. As described above, some form of
the argument has been around for several decades. In 2002, the Court
decided Barnhart, which is perhaps the Court's clearest statement of the
argument, albeit one that fails to describe the BA's theoretical
justification.12 1 The ascension of John Roberts to Chief Justice in 2005,
replacing William Rehnquist, did not significantly alter the Court's
approach to statutory interpretation. Chief Justice Roberts generally
continues to adhere to the predominantly textualist positions of his
predecessor, often voting with Justices Scalia and Thomas on issues of
2 He also authored an opinion that specifically relies on the
interpretation.
3
BA.

12

The replacement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor with Justice Samuel
Alito was a more significant shift toward textualism. Although Justice
O'Connor frequently joined opinions containing textualist reasoning and
language, the consensus is that she was not a strong or consistent
textualist. 124 Notably, she joined Justices Stevens and Breyer-the two
121. It is notable that two nontextualist justices, Justices Souter and Ginsburg, joined the
majority in Barnhart.
122. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 108 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2280 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 435 (2009).
124. See, e.g., Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 102 n. 119; Bradford C. Mank,
Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of PrevailingLegal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815,
869 (2002) ("Justice O'Connor is not a textualist .... "); Linda D. Jellum, On Reading the
Language of Statutes, 8 U. MASS. L. REV. 184, 201 (2013) (describing Justice O'Connor as an
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most purposivist judges to serve on the Roberts Court--dissenting in
Sigmon Coal.125 This dissent invoked an aggressive form of the absurdity
is generally viewed with suspicion among strong
doctrine, which
126
textualists.
In contrast to Justice O'Connor, Justices Roberts and Alito are
stauncher and more consistent textualists. In close cases, they are more
likely to ascribe to reasoning consistent with the BA, than to something like
Justice Breyer's moderate purposivism. In McQuiggin v. Perkins, for
example, Justices Roberts and Alito joined Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissenting to the Court's decision to permit an "actual innocence"
exception to the statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), even though this judicially created
exception pre-dated the Act. 127 Comparing AEDPA to a Swiss watch,
Justice Scalia's dissent reasoned that "the intricate craftsmanship tells us
that the designer arranged things just as he wanted them.""12 This is a
variation on the "presumption of compromise" described above, which is
buttressed by the BA. The dissent also relied on Separation of Powers
concerns that come straight out of Manning's work. The dissent cited to
Manning's influential 2001 article, "Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute," on the history of separation of powers as relevant to courts'
interpretive functions.129 The dissent closely tracked the logic of
Manning's article by referring to "the separation of the legislative and
judicial powers" in prerevolutionary England as "incomplete," thus
implying that a greater separation was intended under the American
Constitution. 3 ° Manning's thesis in that article relies on the BA. 31
Moreover, the dissent cited to Manning's 2006 article, "What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists," for its discussion on textualists' interpretive

"intentionalist-based theorist"); James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The
Supreme Court's Thirstfor Dictionariesin the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 483, 498 (2013); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
ConstruingStatutes in the 1988-89 Term of the UnitedStates Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV.

277, 300 (1990).
125.
126.

See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,462 (2002).
See generally Manning, Absurdity, supra note 10.

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933 (2013).
Id. at 1939 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1941.
130. Id.; see Manning, Equity, supra note 8, at 27-101, 57 (comparing "English antecedents
to 'the judicial Power"' with the American constitutional system and arguing that the "the U.S.
Constitution rejected" the older English approach).
131. Manning, Equity, supra note 8, at 70-78.
127.
128.
129.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 43: 3

techniques. 132 It is hard not to glean, from these citations, an endorsement
of Professor Manning's general theory of interpretation.
Further evidence of affinity for the BA among the Roberts Court's
conservative wing can be found in Justice Alito's concurrence in the 2015
decision Department of Transportation v. Association of American
Railroads.133
There, Justice Alito cites to Manning's 2007 article
"Lawmaking Made Easy," for the proposition that "bicameralism and
presentment make lawmaking difficult by design., 134 This idea is closely
connected to the BA's premise that the difficulty of passing legislation
minorities the right to
reflects the constitutional purpose to give political
35
insist upon compromise as the price of assent. 1
Perhaps the most direct evidence of the acceptance of the BA by the
strong textualists on the Roberts Court is A bramski v. United States; a 2014
decision in which the Court was split 5-4 down predictable lines, with
Justice Kennedy joining the Court's liberal wing in the majority.'3 6 The
question in Abramski was whether the federal Gun Control Act of 1968
criminalizes misrepresentations by someone purchasing a firearm on
someone else's behalf.137 The defendant, Bruce Abramski, was legally
eligible to purchase a gun. 138 He purchased the gun for his uncle, but
falsely asserted on a form that he was the "actual transferee/buyer" of the
gun.' 39 Abramski was prosecuted for making a false statement material to
the sale under the Act. 140 He argued that federal gun control law was only
concerned with representations concerning the purchase eligibility of the
person who directly receives the gun from the transferor, even if that
person is acting as a "straw purchaser" (i.e., as an agent for someone else).
Abramski therefore claimed that his false statement about whether he was
the actual buyer could not be material to the sale under the Act. ' 41 As the

132. McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1942 (citing Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 81-82
& n.42); In another concurrence he wrote on his own, Justice Thomas cited this same article
specifically for its recitation of the Bargaining Argument. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
601-02 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
133. Dep't ofTransp. v. Ass'n of American R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015).
134. Id.at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10
GREEN BAG 2D 202 (2007) [hereinafter Manning, Lawmaking]) (alteration and emphasis
omitted).
135.
136.

See Manning, Lawmaking, supra note 134, at 200.
Abramski v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2259 (2014).

137.
138.

Id.at2263.
Id.at 2265-66.

139.
140.
141.

Id. at2265.
Id.at 2263.
Id.at 2266.
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majority opinion summarized this argument: "So long as the person at the
counter is eligible to own a gun, the sale to him is legal under the
statute. 142
The majority rejected Abramski's position, holding that the buyer or
"transferee" that the statute is concerned with is the ultimate buyer, not the
straw purchaser or agent of the ultimate buyer. The majority conceded that
"[f]ederal gun law regulates licensed dealers' transactions with 'persons' or
'transferees,' without specifically referencing straw purchasers., 143 But the
Court concluded that, in the case of a straw purchase, the law "looks
through the straw to the actual buyer." 144 The Court went on: "The
overarching reason [for this interpretation] is that Abramski's reading
would undermine-indeed for all important purposes, would virtually
repeal-the gun law's core provisions."' 145 The Court noted the primary
purposes of the gun law scheme and reasoned that "no part of that scheme
would work if the statute turned a blind eye to straw purchases" and instead
addressed only the "empty formalit[y]" of who is standing at the counter
handing over the money for the gun. The Court therefore read
the plain
' 146
language in light of its "context, structure, history, and purpose."
Justice Scalia's dissent was joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Roberts. According to these dissenters, "[t]he majority's purpose-based
arguments describe a statute Congress reasonably might have written, but
not the statute it wrote."' 147 After first arguing that the majority overstates
the extent to which the law undermined the statute, the dissent provided a
succinct distillation of the BA:
[P]erhaps Congress drew the line where it did because the
Gun Control Act, like many contentious pieces of
legislation, was a 'compromise' among 'highly interested
parties attempting to pull the provisions in different
directions.' Perhaps those whose votes were needed for
passage of the statute
wanted a lawful purchaser to be able
1 48
to use an agent.

142. Id.
143. Id.at 2267.
144. Id.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2278 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2280 (citing Bamhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 554 U.S. 438, 461 (2002)).
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Two of the most fundamental elements of the argument can be found here:
Specifically, a presumption of hidden compromise and reference to the
possibility that this compromise might have been essential to the law's
enactment. The passage also quotes Barnhart, the Court's leading
exposition of the BA. Abramski vividly illustrates how the argument has
become an important arrow in the quiver of justices opposed to reading
statutory provisions in light of statutory purpose.
The majority in Abramski responded to this argument but largely
missed the point. Conceding that the language in statutes is often the result
of compromise, the majority nonetheless assumed that Congress made no
49
such choice here, because the statute did not mention straw purchasers.
But this response elided the dissenters' argument that the lack of reference
to straw purchasers may itself have been a hidden compromise; the
existence of which should be presumed. The dissenters argued that,
because this compromise could have been essential to the passage of the
law, this compromise must be respected.
The examples above illustrate that, at least until the 2014 Term,
textualists on the Roberts Court have drawn on the BA and on Manning's
work in particular to rebut ostensibly purposivist arguments in statutory
interpretation cases. In particular, the votes and opinions of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito have been largely faithful to the BA.
Against this background, Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion in
King, which was joined by Justice Kennedy, came as a surprise. It was not
so much the result that surprised but rather the extent to which the Court's
reasoning stood at odds with the BA and in line with moderate
purposivism. From a theoretical standpoint, the most notable part of the
Court's opinion was its holding that policy context and structure may
create ambiguity in a facially clear text.
A major difference between strong textualists and moderate
purposivists is that the latter are more willing to consider policy context,
including statutory structure, as evidence of ambiguity. 150 By contrast,
textualism adopts a two-step inquiry. First, judges should rely only on
semantic context to determine if the language is ambiguous. Second, if the
language permits "more than one reasonable understanding," only then
149. See id. at 2271 (majority).
150. Compare, e.g., Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 432 U.S. 50, 65 (2004)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court has suggested that we should only look at legislative
history for the purpose of resolving textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities. It would be wiser
to acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress's true
intent."), with Nat'l Tax Credit Partners, L.P. v. Havlik, 20 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("Knowing the purpose behind a rule may help a court decode an ambiguous
text, but first there must be some ambiguity.").
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may the court consider evidence "of purpose from sources such as the
overall tenor or structure of the statute, its title, or public knowledge of the
So, while it is true that the
problems that inspired its enactment." '
textualist approach is contextual, it is only partly so. 1 52 Because the BA
emphasizes the need to use language as a precise tool to enshrine hidden
compromise, textualists will only consult direct semantic context to decide
whether the statute is ambiguous. Semantic context may include limited
structural evidence that bears directly on semantic meaning, such as the
statute, 53 but it does not encompass "the
position of a term within the 154
broader structure of the [law].'
In King, by contrast, the majority wrote:
Petitioners' arguments about the plain meaning of Section
36B are strong. But while the meaning of the phrase "an
Exchange established by the State under [42 U. S. C.
§ 18031]" may seem plain "when viewed in isolation," such
a reading turns out to be "untenable in light of [the statute]
as a whole. 155
The citation to ACF Industries is telling. There, the Court held that a
petitioner's reading of a statute, "while plausible when viewed 1' in
56
isolation... is untenable in light of [the statutory section] as a whole."
The A CF Industries holding was consistent with textualism, which allows
structure and policy context to illuminate ambiguous provisions. The
provision in ACF Industries was facially ambiguous, but the provision at
issue in King was not, according to the majority. King therefore departed
from textualist principles by using context to introduce ambiguity into
language that the majority admitted was otherwise "plain" from a semantic
standpoint. The majority was perfectly transparent in what it was doing:
"In this instance, the context and structure of the Act compel us to depart
from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent
statutory phrase.' 5 7
Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 85.
152. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Context
always matters. Let us not forget, however, why context matters: It is a tool for understanding the
terms of the law, not an excuse for rewriting them.").
153. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427,2441 (2014).
154. King, 135 S.Ct. at 2494 (citing Dep't of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332,
343 (1994).
151.

155.
156.

Id.at 2495.
ACFlndus., 510 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added).

157.

King, 135 S.Ct.at 2495.
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The Court in King relied on statutory purpose as part of the "context"
relied upon to reach a decision. The Court wrote: "Congress passed the
Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy
them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is
consistent with the former, and avoids the latter. 1 58 This is bluntly
purposivist language. The Court also quoted a prior decision from the
1970s for the principle: "We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their
own stated purposes."1 59 The Court reasoned that "the statutory scheme
compels us to reject petitioners' interpretation because it would destabilize
the individual insurance market in any State with a Federal Exchange, and
likely create the very 'death spirals' that Congress designed the Act to
avoid."'160 In other words, Chief Justice Roberts' opinion relied on the
highly anomalous results of the plain text reading to eliminate this reading:
exactly what a strong form of the BA forbids. That said, King does not
exactly amount to a repudiation of the BA. Rather, the Chief Justice's
opinion merely allows for the presumption of compromise to be overcome
where the plain text reading has the potential to severely undermine or
"negate" the broader statutory scheme.
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, did not
expressly mention the BA, despite the D.C. Circuit's reliance on it.
Nonetheless, the dissent drew its theoretical underpinnings from the
argument. The dissent claimed that where the "natural and ordinary"
meaning of the words points in only one direction, the Court should not
rely on policy context to impose a different meaning. 16 1 It repeated the
textualist principle that "statutory design and purpose matter only to the
extent they help clarify an otherwise ambiguous provision.' 1 62 It also
emphasized that the "oddity" of this reading is not sufficient reason to
depart from it. 163 The dissent claimed that the Court should not "rescue
Congress from its drafting errors." Finally, the dissent alluded to the
possibility of compromise by noting that "[n]o law pursues just one
purpose at all costs, and no statutory scheme encompasses just one
element."' 64 As applied to the facts, the dissent suggested that the plain
158. Id. at 2496.
159. Id. at 2493 (quoting N.Y. State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20
(1973)).
160.
161.

Id.at 2492-93.
Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
162. Id. at 2502.
163. Id. at 2501.
164. Id. at 2504; cf Abramski, 134 S. Ct. at 2278 ("But no law pursues its purpose at all
costs, and the textual limitations upon a law's scope are equally a part of its purpose.") (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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text reading could have been a balance between the twin goals of "enabling
the Act's reforms' 6 to work and promoting state involvement in the Act's
implementation. ,1 1
Taken together with other decisions, King revealed that there are at
least three distinct positions with regard to preserving legislative
compromise through statutory interpretation. First, there are likely four
Justices (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) who would
acknowledge that courts should generally respect compromise but also
permit strong contextual evidence of legislative intent to modify the clear
semantic meaning of the text. Second, there are two Justices (Justices
Roberts and Kennedy) who presume in most cases that the plain text
reflects compromise, even when the results are odd, except where the plain
text would severely undermine the overall statutory scheme. 166 Third, there
are three Justices (Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito), who ascribe to the
full implications of the BA and hold that courts should only depart from the
plain text when67 the results would be "absurd" or reflect an unmistakable
drafting error.
Finally, note that on the same day that the King opinion was released,
the Court also handed down a decision in another statutory interpretation
case, Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc. 168 There, the Chief Justice rejoined Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in dissent over the proper interpretation of the
Fair Housing Act. This dissent, authored by Justice Alito, manifests a
Without direct evidence of a
strong presumption of compromise.
compromise over the disputed provision, the dissenters nonetheless argued
that the provision had "all the hallmarks of a compromise" because it cut a
middle course between competing policy positions reflected in the Act's
legislative history. The four dissenters quoted Wolverine and insisted that
the Court "must respect and give effect to these sorts of compromises.' 6 9
Therefore, while King clarified an interesting and important division within

165.

Id.
166. Justices Roberts and Kennedy split in Abramski, but I read this split as reflecting
differing views as to the extent to which the plain text would actually undermine the core
purposes of the Gun Control Act. It also seems likely that Justice Kennedy has a lower threshold
for concluding that statutory purposes would be undermined to such a degree that the plain text
reading should be modified.
167. Note that Justice Scalia passed away very shortly before this Article went to print. If
his successor is appointed by a Democratic president, it seems likely that the Court would be left
with only two staunch textualists.
168. Tex. Dep't of Housing and Comty. Affairs v. Inclusive Comtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507 (2015).
169.

Id. at 2541 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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the textualist camp, Texas Department of Housing reaffirms the centrality
of the BA within the Roberts Court.

VI. A Critique of the Bargaining Argument
This Article has attempted to summarize and, to some extent,
reconstruct the constitutional argument for textualism, which is based on
the primacy of legislative compromise. The details of the argument are
largely culled from the writings of John Manning, textualism's primary
academic defender. At this point, I will shift to an evaluation of the merits
of the BA; in particular, whether the argument justifies preserving hidden
bargains, such as backroom deals, to the maximum extent possible.
We may begin by agreeing with a central premise of the argument:
that the constitutional design promotes legislative compromise. It is well
known that the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President are
elected through different means, and for different terms. Each of these
bodies represents a different constituency, with House members
representing the most local and the President the most national.
Bicameralism ensures that more local constituencies often have the power
to block even legislation that gainers widespread national support. We see
this dynamic today concerning issues such as the legalization of marijuana,
immigration reform, and climate change regulation. Though a majority of
Americans support action on these issues, no law has been able to make it
through the bicameralism process. Further, Article V's placement of equal
Senate suffrage beyond the amendment process gives states with smaller
populations an outsized vote on national issues. In this way, the
Constitution unmistakably grants political minorities the power to hold up
the legislative process.
Given that the constitutional design creates strong incentives for
compromise, it is appropriate to adopt a general presumption of enforcing
the statute as written without specific evidence of contrary intent. When
the text of the statute directly and affirmatively resolves the case at hand,
courts should not override it, even if the result is anomalous from the
perspective of the statutory scheme. Moreover, where there is evidence
that a particular provision was the result of a compromise, courts should
adopt a strong presumption in favor of the literal text, lest the compromise
be disturbed.
But what about where there the policy context suggests that the
anomalous results of the plain text are the result, not of compromise, but of
sloppy drafting? Here, textualism continues to counsel against reading the
text in light of statutory purpose, even when the result is, if not downright
absurd, at least very strange.
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In the following sections, I argue that, when it comes to hidden
compromise, the BA is missing a link. It explains how the constitutional
design protects compromise, but it does not provide a compelling reason to
preserve hypothetical hidden compromise. It does not justify a blanket and
near-insurmountable presumption of compromise in every case of statutory
incoherence.
A. Constitutional Textualism as a Prior Assumption
Manning's theory of statutory interpretation assumes a logically prior
textualist theory of constitutional interpretation, which requires separate
justification. We need not venture too far into this constitutional theory,
except to say that it largely mirrors his theory of statutory interpretation.
Manning advocates the "ordinary interpretation" of the Constitution, which
treats the Constitution as if it were like a statute. He rejects the notion that
the Constitution is a fundamentally different kind of legal text from statutes
that should be interpreted using different principles.
Under this method, where the Constitution speaks with specificity,
courts should make the same presumption of compromise as with
statutes.170 But when it comes to defining more indeterminate provisions,
like the phrase, "the judicial power," courts may fill in the gaps to
"liquidate" the meaning of the Constitution.17 1 When liquidating the text,
courts should focus primarily on the same types of evidence of "original
meaning" that textualism advocates for interpreting statutes, including
structure and context.
In the case of "the judicial power," Manning
arrives at the conclusion that this provision mandates statutory textualism
1 73
primarily by making structural inferences from the constitutional design,
which entails reading' 74"' [the judicial power]' in the light of surrounding
constitutional terms.'
But even if drawing structural inferences may be an appropriate means
of clarifying some open-ended constitutional provisions, it is far from

170.

John F. Manning,

The Eleventh Amendment and the Interpretation of Precise

Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1716-17 (2004) [hereinafter Manning, Eleventh
Amendment].

171. Id.at 1729.
172. Id. at 1729-30 (describing practical liquidation as consistent with constitutional
textualism).
173. See Manning, Separation, supra note 54, at 2034 (describing structural inferences as
"perhaps [the] most promising... way to lend determinacy to the vesting clauses"); see also
Manning, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 170, at 1707 n. 160 ("I rely on structural inferences
from Article I, Section 7 and Articles V and VII to determine the appropriate content of 'the
judicial Power' to declare the law applicable to a case or controversy.").
174.

Manning, Separation,supra note 54, at 2034.
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obvious that "the judicial power" is a large enough peg on which to hang
an entire theory of statutory interpretation. The Constitution does not
specifically define this phrase and does not expressly mandate a particular
interpretive approach.
Moreover, the inferences Manning draws do not speak loudly. As will
be discussed in more detail below, the surrounding constitutional
provisions that Manning wishes to read "the judicial power" in light ofbicameralism, Article V, and the Necessary and Proper Clause-manifest a
general purpose of preserving minority rights and permitting Congress to
define the manner and scope of legislation. But textualism is not the only
interpretive method that remains faithful to these purposes. As explained
below, the notion that surrounding constitutional provisions evince a more
particular intent to presume legislative compromise in all cases of statutory
incoherence involves an unjustifiably large inferential leap. The reason
Manning must take this leap on the basis of indirect structural evidence is
that his theory of constitutional interpretation rules out, as theoretically
illegitimate, other less textualist means of liquidating broad constitutional
clauses.
I do not mean to gainsay that sound reasons may exist for relying
almost exclusively on structural inferences to liquidate "the judicial
power." To evaluate these reasons here would take us too far afield into
the theory of constitutional interpretation. I merely wish to highlight that
the constitutional method Manning uses to arrive at the BA depends on an
independent theory of constitutional interpretation. For the BA to succeed
on its own terms, then, requires a theoretically separate justification of
This justification must explain why the
constitutional textualism.
Constitution should not be treated differently from ordinary statutes.
B.

Critique of the Maximalist Position

We can now move on to evaluate the BA more closely based on its
internal logic, taking as given that structural inferences are an appropriate
means of liquidating "the judicial power." As discussed, textualists rely on
these inferences to support a presumption of compromise that maximizes
the preservation of legislative compromise. The most notable feature of
this "maximalist position" is that it mandates the preservation of hidden
compromise, regardless of whether there exists any specific evidence of
compromise. According to the BA, this empirical question should not
concern us. What matters is that there was some possibility that the literal
text was the result of compromise. If so, the Constitution is best read as
requiring that courts err on the side of preserving as much compromise as
possible. "[T]o do otherwise would be to dilute important, constitutionally
ordained, as well as legislatively adopted, procedural safeguards that give
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political minorities extraordinary power to' 175block legislative change and
insist on compromise as the price of assent."
But this argument leaves a theoretical gap that has not been filled in
by textualism's defenders. Namely, if bicameralism already permits
political minorities "extraordinary power" to hold legislation hostage, then,
why is it necessary to interpret "the judicial power" in a way that gives
minorities even more control on the back end, to undermine the purposes of
legislation through hidden bargains? Manning argues that only a strong
form of textualism will present the "dilution" of "procedural safeguards"
that help minorities. But this point assumes the conclusion that the
preservation of hidden compromise is the initial baseline set by the
Constitution, which can either be preserved or "diluted."
The structural inferences that support this conclusion are tenuous at
best. It seems just as reasonable to suppose that the Constitution's specific
and detailed designation of a legislative process (bicameralism and
presentment) that protects minority rights is a textual indication that courts
should not imply additional rights through structural reasoning. 176 From
this perspective, the BA can be seen as bestowing a gratuitous power to
enshrine textual compromises that conflict with contrary indicia of
congressional intent that may be more probative than the semantic meaning
in isolation.
Where the constitutional design indicates that the Framers already
carefully crafted the means of protecting minority rights, courts should be
wary of expanding these rights based on the purposes of other
constitutional provisions (especially Article I, Sec. 7 and Article V) that do
not directly speak to "the judicial power." Recall the textualist concern that
' 177
compromise often "result[s] in a decision to go so far and not further."
Or, as Justice Scalia put it in McQuiggin, "the intricate craftsmanship tells
us that the designer arranged things just as he wanted them.' 78 If, as
textualists often argue, the Constitution was itself the result of compromise,
then perhaps the Framers did not intend to maximize minority power
through legal interpretation. Perhaps, instead, the limits of minority power
are prescribed through the carefully arranged express provisions of the
constitutional text.

175.

Manning, Second-Generation,supra note 45, at 1314.

176. By "structural reasoning" I mean the kind of specific text-based purposivism that is
compatible with textualist methodology.
"Structural inferences" are a kind of structural
purposivist reasoning.
177. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist., 531 U.S. 57, 68-69
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
178.

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1939 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The likely textualist response to this argument is that because the
Constitution clearly evinces the intent to set up procedural safeguards for
minorities, courts should not rely on methods of statutory interpretation that
directly undermine this design. Accepting this point as true, we may
concede that it would be unacceptable for a court to override an open
compromise. But when it comes to hidden compromise, the argument
again begs the question: would courts' refusal to apply a presumption of
hidden compromise actually undermine the rights of political minorities?
The answer is either not at all or very little. Consider that, even if courts do
not apply the presumption, political minorities would not thereby lose the
power to insist upon compromise. Under bicameralism, legislation would
still need to secure approval from both houses of Congress and the
The same procedural safeguards that create a de facto
President.
"supermajority" requirement would still be in place.
Rather, all that would be lost if courts refused to presume compromise
would be the ability to preserve bargains in one specific situation; namely,
where: (1) there is no record or textual indication that the bargain occurred,
(2) the substance of the bargain is not written clearly into the statute, 79 and
(3) the bargain creates substantial awkwardness or incoherence in relation
to the statute as a whole. All three of these conditions would have to be
met before a court could reasonably conclude that the awkward
implications of the plain text are the likely result of inadvertence or error
on the part of drafters.
It is therefore not clear how or why a court's refusal to presume
compromise in every case of statutory incoherence would actually
"undermine" the purposes of bicameralism and other constitutional
provisions. Erasing a hidden compromise does not directly interfere with
or detract from the operation of any other provision of the Constitution. It
does not cause political minorities to lose any of the power that express
provisions of the Constitution afford them. Rather, it merely deprives them
of the right to create statutory incoherence in secret, rather than out in the
open. Manning considerably overstates his case by suggesting that the
safeguards that the Constitution provides for political minorities would be
"threaten[ed]" 180 if courts fail to zealously preserve hidden textual
compromises.
179. I want to be careful to distinguish the "substance" of the bargain from its "existence."
By "substance" I am not talking about the fact that bargaining took place. Rather, I am talking
about the product of the bargain: its intended results. As discussed below, I assume, despite the
inherent vagaries of language, it is almost always possible for legislators to use language to make
clear the intended result in a certain specific circumstance, if that circumstance is the subject of

compromise.
180.

See Manning, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 170, at 1694.
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To the contrary, the maximalist position creates a risk of swinging the
pendulum too far in the direction of protecting minority rights. In the
present era of partisan and special interest gridlock, it would be hard to
deny that political minorities wield an enormous amount of power in
government. The provision of two senators per state means that a minority
party can achieve a sizable legislative majority despite representing a
significant minority of citizens. 181 Furthermore, legislatively adopted
political maneuvers like the Senate filibuster and the gerrymandering of
House districts give political minorities even greater power to insist on
compromise. 182 It would be difficult to claim that the political system
created by the Constitution provides any dearth of opportunities for
political minorities to hold legislation hostage. However, the maximalist
position entails a view that, because the real-world effects of the
constitutional design give so much power to political minorities, other
provisions of the text should be interpreted to bestow even more power.
Logic does not require this result.

181. Dylan Matthews, The Senate's 46 Democrats got 20 million more votes than its
54 Republicans, VOX (Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/1/3/7482635/senate-small-states.
182. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Democratic House candidates winning the popular vote, despite
big GOP majority, WASH. POST, (Nov. 9, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2012/11/09/democratic-house-candidates-winning-the-popular-vote-despite-big-gop-major
ityl; Burgess Everett, Democrats Learn to Love the Filibuster, POLITICO, (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/senate-democrats-filibuster-114888.
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Conditions Under Which a Presumption of Compromise Is
Necessary to Preserve Legislative Compromise
1. The compromise is hidden (otherwise intent to compromise is clear).
AND
2. The plain text does not affirmatively answer the interpretive question
(otherwise there is no possible alternative reading).
AND
3. The policy context conflicts with the semantic context (otherwise
there is no reason to depart from semantic meaning).
Example 1: In Sigmon Coal, there was no evidence of a compromise
over disputed provision (.), the plain text did not affirmatively exempt
successors of signatory operations (2.), and successors of signatory
operators bear a closer relationship to retired workers of signatory
operators than successors to "related persons" to the signatory operator
(3.).
Example 2: In King, there was no evidence of a compromise over
disputed provision (1.), the plain text did not affirmatively exclude
federally-established exchanges from subsidies (2.), and this exclusion
would severely undermine the stated purpose of the legislation for no
apparent reason (3.).
C. The Plain Text as a Necessary Legislative Tool
Even if sweeping away hidden compromise would not directly
undermine the exercise of minority rights protected in other express
provisions of the Constitution, Manning has another argument for why
textualism nonetheless serves an essential role in the constitutional design.
He writes that "Semantic meaning provides the most, if not the only,
reliable means by which legislators can express the relevant limits on how
far they are willing to go. ' 183 Conversely, "if one were to give background
purpose priority over semantic detail, then it would be quite difficult to
fathom how a legislator with the power to exact a compromise could

183.

Manning, Competing Presumptions,supra note 113, at 2040.
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bargain reliably for any particular outcome."'' 84 This is a kind of thegreater-power-implies-the-lesser argument. The greater power is the
allocation of political power to give political minorities the right to hold
legislation hostage. The lesser power is the ability to use that leverage to
create textual compromises that can be enshrined in the plain text of
legislation.
But is preserving hidden bargains really "necessary" to effectively
record compromise, as Manning claims? 185 Take Barnart v. Sigmon Coal
as an example. Assume that coal companies had successfully lobbied a
powerful minority of lawmakers to exclude successors of signatory
operators from the part of the statute concerning the assignment of
retirement benefits. Assume further that this lobbying occurred behind
closed doors, with no record either of the fact that it took place, or of the
resulting compromise. Without the support of the lawmakers in question,
the Coal Act would not have been passed. On the other hand, the exclusion
of successors to signatory operators flies in the face of the statute's purpose
to identify the persons "most responsible for plan liabilities," and sits
incongruously with the express reference to successors of related persons.
If the case had come out the other way, and the Supreme Court had
concluded that the statutory incongruity was an inadvertent oversight and
upheld the Commissioner's interpretation on that basis, to what extent
would lawmakers have lost the capacity to compromise? Certainly one
avenue for recording compromise would be lost-that of omitting reference
to the successors. But this was not the only, and certainly not the clearest,
method of recording the hypothetical compromise in Sigmon. Lawmakers
could have written the law to expressly state that, "successors of signatory
operators shall not" be responsible for plan liabilities. This would have
been a much more direct and unambiguous 86 path to the intended result
than the omission of any reference to signatory operator successors. If
successor liability had actually been bargained for, it is highly likely that
bargainers would have insisted upon the clearest possible language to
enshrine the compromise, unless either: (1) the bargainers wanted the
existence of an actual compromise to remain hidden; or (2) they believed
(unreasonably) the "omission" approach was so clear that courts could not
fail to recognize it.
184.
185.

Id.
ld. at 2038.
186. Courts and scholars speak as though ambiguity is an either/or proposition, and in a legal
sense this is true: At a certain point, courts treat marginally ambiguous statutes as being "clear."
But the reality is that ambiguity is by definition a matter of degree, and language can be more or
less ambiguous. The direct statement that successors will not be liable is obviously the least
ambiguous legal statement that will produce this effect.
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In fact, in virtually any situation where the BA could be dispositive, it
will have been possible to enshrine the hidden compromise more clearly.
Therefore, the presumption of compromise is not strictly necessary for
legislators to effectively record compromise."8 7 At most, textualism would
be necessary to keep the existence of legislative bargains-horse-tradingcompletely hidden from the public.
Even if not strictly necessary, one could argue that textualism makes it
significantly easier for "Congress to use its words to draw ... awkward,
uneven, and overinclusive lines."' 88 That is, if courts sometimes read
statutes in light of contrary indicia of intent from the policy context,
legislators may need to draft with greater specificity and clarity in order to
enshrine awkward compromises. For example, if a particular outcome is
important to lawmakers, it may be necessary for drafters to address the
issue point blank, rather than, say, through the operation of a canon of
construction or through negative implication.
Fortunately, it is not difficult to use language to convey the intent of a
legislative compromise. To see why this is so requires bringing out an
important assumption in my argument: The ultimate goal of any legislative
compromise is to produce particular results, and not merely the
incorporation of language into the statute for its own sake. Because
lawmaking is a purposive enterprise, lawmakers always have real-world
ends in mind. These ends may be envisioned with more or less specificity
by legislators, but in legal cases involving a potential compromise, a
court's focus should always be on whether Congress specifically intended
the result that a plain-text reading would produce in the case at bar.
Therefore, so long as it is possible to linguistically frame the subject matter
of the "case or controversy," it will have been possible for lawmakers to
use language to directly address the issue at hand.
Consider the famous case of Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, a classic example of a robust purposivism.'8 9 Manning has argued
that the relevant provision there, a broad statutory prohibition on assistance
for foreign citizens to migrate to the United States to perform "labor or
service of any kind," could have been a compromise. He has written:
"Perhaps crucial elements of the enacting coalition preferred a broader
prohibition than the commonly held purpose [addressing the problem of

187. "Effectively" refers to the capacity to have the compromise enforced by courts.
188. Manning, ConstitutionalPower,supranote 9, at 67.
189. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892). Because of its
canonical status, I do not recount the facts here. Moreover, though I use the facts of the case for
exemplary purposes, I do not mean to provide a complete defense to the Court's holding, a
subject on which I am agnostic.
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"cheap unskilled labor"] would support."' 190 Moreover: "If, as in Holy
Trinity, the Court applies a judge-made presumption that the drafters
misspoke, then Congress cannot reliably use broad language to adopt an
encompassing rule or to strike an imperfect compromise, at least when
doing so introduces problems of means-ends fit (as is typically the
case).''

9

However, this conclusion may not be correct even as applied to Holy
Trinity. Let us assume that there was in fact a legislative compromise for
the phrase "labor or service of any kind" to encompass skilled and
intellectual work. 192 In this event, the hypothetical compromise still did not
speak directly and affirmatively with regard to the question presented in the
case: whether the prohibition was meant to sweep up one particular,
Exempting clergy from the
unusual "profession": religious clergy.
statutory prohibition does not undo the more general compromise Manning
hypothesizes. Only if the Court had reached beyond the facts of the case to
exempt all skilled labor would the statute have undone the hypothesized
compromise. 93 By contrast, the only compromise the Court's holding may
have actually erased would have concerned clergy in particular. If this
minor and extraordinary circumstance was important to the "enacting
coalition," however, the law's drafters could have directly addressed it
through various means, such as a provision that: "Service of a religious
nature shall not be exempted from the definition of 'labor or service."'
That Congress did not include such a provision indicates that clergy were
likely not a sticking point in the drafting process, even if the plain text
suggests that other, more conventional forms of skilled labor may have
been. The lesson from Holy Trinity is that if an otherwise incongruous
result is important enough for lawmakers to make it a focus of the
legislative process, an interpreter would expect that Congress would
specifically address the issue in the statute.
One could object here that it would be onerous for courts to require
Congress to spell out legislative compromises in detail. Instead, Congress
190.

Manning, ConstitutionalPower, supra note 9, at 21-22.

191. Id.at 22.
192. In fact, there is a strong textual argument for this conclusion, even from a purposivist
perspective.
193. Though there is not space to devote to the topic, I disagree with commentators who
believe the holding of Holy Trinity excluded all skilled and intellectual labor from the statute's
ambit. I believe close attention to the language reveals that the "religious nation" part of the
opinion, rather than being a narrower alternative ground is actually essential to the narrow
holding that clergy are exempted. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits
of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1842
(1998). But even if the "broad" reading of Holy Trinity is correct, the Court could and, in that
event, should have chosen the narrower ground that I posit here as more theoretically defensible.
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should be able to effectively choose more indirect means to achieve a
result, such as negative implication, so long as the bare words of the statute
(in semantic context) would be facially clear to a reasonable speaker
familiar with relevant linguistic conventions. But this objection loses sight
of the practical motivation behind legislative compromise, which is to
ensure that the intended results are actually realized. If compromise
centers on intended results, and if those results are important enough for
legislators to seek to use statutory language to produce them, why would
any reasonable legislator use less-than-direct language to do so?
For example, if the authors of the ACA's subsidy provisions intended
to exclude insurance purchased on federally established exchanges from
subsidies, why would Congress have "used such a winding path of connectthe-dots provisions"'' 94 to "translate its policy precisely into law,"1' 95 rather
than coming right out with it? The "connect-the-dots" approach is not how
people typically use language to convey intentions, and courts should be
able to take this reality into account. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "Had
Congress meant to limit tax credits to State Exchanges, it likely would have
done so in the definition of 'applicable taxpayer' or in some other
prominent manner."1' 96 But the anomaly of using an indirect method to
produce such a consequential result only becomes clear by considering
broader statutory context and purposes, which textualism forbids if the
language is semantically clear. I am not suggesting that Congress must use
the most direct means of achieving a particular legislative outcome; only
that courts should be able to consider the indirectness of the means of
achieving that outcome as evidence weighing against the likelihood that
compromise occurred.
From the discussion above, it is clear that courts must abide by two
general interpretative principles in order for legislators to be able to reliably
record compromises. First, courts must respect open compromises where
they occur, and generally weigh any specific evidence of compromise. For
example, when the statute or legislative history indicates that a particular
provision was the subject of a compromise, courts should strictly construe
that provision. Second, courts must never deviate from plain language that
speaks directly and affirmatively to the interpretive issue. 197 By "directly
and affirmatively," I mean that the text actually addresses the precise

194.
195.

King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015).
Manning, ConstitutionalPower, supra note 9, at 71.

196. King, 135 S.Ct. at 2495.
197. Cf Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 (2014) ("[T]his Court
has no roving license, in even ordinary cases of statutory interpretation, to disregard clear
language simply on the view that ...Congress 'must have intended' something broader.").
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interpretive issue, such that an interpreter need only read the relevant text
to know the intended result for the case at bar. It should be noted that, as
with pretty much everything in statutory interpretation, the extent to which
a text provides a "direct and affirmative" answer to an interpretive issue is
a matter of degree. The point is that courts must respect language that
appears to directly contemplate the facts posed in a case, such that the
semantic evidence outweighs even strong contrary evidence of intent from
the policy context.
If courts abide by these two principles, then legislators will be able to
reliably use the plain text of the statute to enshrine legislative compromise.
The preservation of hidden compromise is not strictly necessary to achieve
this goal. Therefore, a presumption of compromise is not essential for
compromise to be enforced by courts.
D.

Transparency as a Competing Structural Inference

We have seen how the Bargaining Argument proceeds from structural
inferences drawn from surrounding constitutional provisions, particularly
Article I, Section 7 and Article V. But the argument also does not take into
account an important competing inference, that the constitutional design
evinces the intent to privilege legislative transparency. This competing
inference is inconsistent with the maximalist position. 198
At least four parts of the constitutional text support a constitutional
preference for transparency: the general provision of a republican form of
government, bicameralism, the Speech and Debate Clause, and the Journal
Clause. Together, this constellation of textual provisions permits the
inference that secrecy in the legislative process should be permitted but not
privileged in the way textualism directs.
We can start with the obvious: the Constitution provides for a
representative and republican form of government. 199 Indeed, the very
word "republic" comes from the Latin res ("thing", "entity") and publicus
("of the people"). Ours is not a direct democracy, but the preamble to the
Constitution tells us that it is a government "ordain[ed] and establish[ed]"
by "We the People." This language clearly suggests the intent for ultimate
citizen oversight of government. In order for citizens to receive effective
representation under this system, they must be able to evaluate the votes

198. Note that I am arguing here from within the context of constitutional textualism, though
I do not concede this to be the best mode of constitutional interpretation. To the extent to which
the analysis in this section seems strained, my point is merely that the transparency inference is
no less strained than the "minority rights" inference underlying the BA.
199. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison) ("The elective mode of obtaining rulers
is the characteristic policy of republican government.").
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and decisions of their representatives. 200 A blanket presumption of hidden
compromise undermines this system by privileging secret bargains over
what legislators represent to the public that they are actually doing.
Second, as Manning notes, bicameralism requires that legislation gain
the acceptance of lawmakers representing three distinct constituencies. It is
true that the legislative process results in a de facto supermajority
requirement for legislation. But bicameralism also plainly provides for a
broader public and private airing of the law by providing for separate
deliberative "moments" by each actor in the lawmaking process. I assume
here that the deliberative purposes of bicameralism are furthered in
proportion to the extent that the three actors have shared understandings
about the effects of the bill.
This assumption dovetails with the
Madisonian theory of faction. For example, in Federalist 62, Madison
wrote that bicameralism "doubles the security to the people, by requiring
the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy,
'20 1
where the ambition or corruption of one, would otherwise be sufficient
From a more positive standpoint, allowing legislation to be "vetted" by
separate bodies renders it more likely that unwise, erroneous, or unintended
provisions will be corrected.2 2 But the vetting process will not function
perfectly unless legislative actors both agree on the relevant "semantic
context" used to interpret the statute, and have the time and resources to
think through the implications of "background conventions" (like canons of
construction) that may be applied rigidly by a court. Unless these
unrealistic conditions are met,2°3 it is likely that drafting errors will "slip"
through the cracks of the multi-body deliberative process. As a result, the
version of the statute imposed by courts relying on semantic evidence may
be quite different from the version each of these actors thought they were

200. Cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison) ("As it is essential to liberty that the
government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly
essential that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on, and an
intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by
which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.").
201. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
202. See ROBERT HISLOPE & ANTHONY MUGHAN, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
POLITICS: THE STATE AND ITS CHALLENGES 112-13 (2012) (describing the "redundancy"

rationale for bicameralism and tracing some of its history); THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James
Madison) (arguing that a Senate would help the legislature "escape a variety of important errors
in the exercise of their legislative trust" owing to a lack of practical wisdom by representatives).
203. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist
Theories of Statutory Interpretation-andthe Irreducible Roles of Values Judgments Within Both,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 709-10 (2014) [hereinafter Fallon, Three Symmetries] (describing as
"unworkable" the suggestion that the background linguistic conventions that largely compromise
semantic context can be "reduced to a determinate list of rules set out in advance").
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passing. The damage this result would have for the deliberative purposes
of bicameralism should be weighed against the benefits to the
constitutional structure of supporting political minorities' ability to forge
hidden compromise.
Third, the Constitution expressly anticipates that legislation will be
aired through "Speech or Debate" in both houses of Congress.2 °4 As
recounted by Justice Harlan in one of the few Supreme Court decisions
concerning the Speech or Debate Clause, the clause was approved "without
discussion and without opposition."' 20 5 It was adapted from an earlier
formulation in the Articles of Confederation, which read: "'Freedom of
speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any
court, or place out of Congress .. .. ,,,206 This language, in turn, descended
from the English Bill of Rights, which read: "That the Freedom of Speech,
and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or
questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament., 20 7 By protecting
legislators for what they say, the Speech or Debate Clause emphasizes the
centrality and importance of open debate in the legislative process. An
obvious purpose of protecting freedom of speech and debate in Congress is
to encourage direct and candid discussion of legislation.
Fourth, the Constitution expressly provides for the publication of
votes and proceedings. Article I, Section 5, the Journal Clause, states:
"Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any
question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
The Constitution therefore assumes that the substance of
Journal."
congressional proceedings, including lawmakers' votes, should generally
be available to the public. Of course, the Journal Clause does not require
making lawmakers' private discussions and backroom negotiating public.
But it does weigh against privileging surreptitiousness, by setting open
proceedings as the default, with "Secrecy" reserved for special
circumstances. 2°8 Moreover, the bar for recording the votes of each
member is set quite low-"one fifth of those Present." This figure is "the

204. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 6 (stating that lawmakers shall be privileged from arrest or
questioning relating to various congressional duties including speech or debate).
205. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966) (citing V Elliot's Debates 406
(1836 ed.) and I1 Records of the Federal Convention 246 (Farrand ed. 1911)).
206.
207.

Id. (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V).
Id. at 178 (quoting 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2.).

208. This is the same kind of structural inference favored by Manning for liquidating broad
constitutional terms. Cf Adrian Vermeule, The ConstitutionalLaw of CongressionalProcedure,
71 U. CHI. L. REv. 361, 410-11 (2004) [hereinafter Vermuele, CongressionalProcedure].
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lowest fraction to appear anywhere in the Constitution.,
It allows a
small minority to force transparency on the entire chamber-another clear
preference for openness over secrecy. 210 Finally, this textual provision
dovetails with the historical practice of opening House and Senate
proceedings to the public. To wit, "[t]he House opened its doors to the
public from the start, and the Senate followed by the mid-1790s. ''211
Professor Vermeule has argued that "framers who advocated mandatory
transparency of congressional deliberation and voting did so with the
explicit recognition that encoding transparency in the constitutional bargain
would help to dispel antifederalist concerns about the power of the new
national government." 212 Further, these initial steps toward transparency
were "in broad historical compass a recent design innovation" that brought
about even more transparency "through voluntary legislative action" due to
2 3
their early popularity with voters. 1
The constitutional preference for legislative transparency and open
debate therefore seems at least as well supported as the intent to allow
political minorities to insist upon compromise that serves the primary basis
for the BA. Preserving hidden compromise where the policy context
suggests a contrary legislative intent undermines this competing
constitutional value.214 Therefore, even if we use the structural inferences
method to liquidate the judicial vesting clause, the opposing constitutional
preference for transparency weighs against reading "the judicial power" to
permit and even encourage lawmakers to hide crucial details concerning the
legislative process. This concern seems especially pressing when the actual
content of the legislation, in the textualist sense of semantic meaning, may be
effectively concealed during the legislative process by using a "poison pill"
approach. For example, clever legislators trying to secretly undermine the
intended results of legislation could insert a seemingly innocuous phrase that
will throw a large wrench into a complex and finely calibrated statutory
scheme. In the case of hidden compromise, the constitutional preference for

209. Chesa Boudin, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 2140, 2161 (2011).
210. Cf Vermeule, Congressional Procedure, supra note 208, at 421 ("[M]andated
transparency also enhances the monitoring of bargains between legislators and other actors.").
211.
Id. (citing DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING
FATHERS: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS 24-29, 48-49, 55-61 (1981)).

212. Id. at 415.
213. Id.
214. Indeed, the BA may actually undermine this purpose, in contrast to the problematic
claim, criticized above, that correcting unintended statutory incoherence undermines the
minority's right to insist on compromise during the legislative process.
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transparency pushes back against and may outweigh the competing
preference for compromise that undergirds the BA.
E.

The Literalism Trap

My final criticism is not new, but it takes on added force in light of
this presentation of the theoretical foundations of the BA. It is that the
logic of the argument pushes courts toward application of the literal text at
the expense of other probative indicia congressional intent.2 15
Manning takes pains to contrast modem textualism with the
But Manning's
"literalism" of the older "plain meaning" school. 16
conception of "literalism" is cramped. He equates the "literal" meaning
with the dictionary definition.2 17 Adopting this conception, he can then
argue that modem textualism is "contextual" rather than literalistic,
because it accounts for linguistic "nuances and conventions" that do not
appear in dictionaries, including "background legal conventions. 2 18 At the
same time, the "semantic context" used to determine whether statutory
language is clear is limited to "evidence about the way a reasonable person
conversant with relevant social and linguistic practices would have used the
words. 219 It is only if the language is semantically unclear in context that
textualists will declare the statute ambiguous. 220 Thus:
When contextual evidence of semantic usage points
decisively in one direction, that evidence takes priority
over contextual evidence that relates to questions of policy.
The latter category includes matters such as public
knowledge of the mischief the lawmakers sought to
address; the way competing interpretations of a discrete
statutory provision fit with the policy reflected in the
statute's preamble, title, or overall structure; and the way
alternative readings of the statute fit with the policy
221
expressed in similar statutes.

215. See generally, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1913 (2006).
216. Manning, Absurdity, supra note 10, at 2456.
217. See id at 2456, 2393.
218.
219.

Id. at 2458, 2465-66.
Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 91.

220.
221.

Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 93.
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In other words, "contextual evidence that relates to questions of policy"
should only be considered when the statute is ambiguous.222
If we define literalism as strict adherence to the dictionary, the
textualist approach is not literalistic. But the BA may foster a different and
only slightly less rigid form of literalism: sticking with the plain language
of the statute, considered in linguistic isolation, even when there is strong
contrary evidence of congressional intent from other sources.223 This
literalism follows from the presumption that lawmakers have bargained
over every word of the statute. Under the BA, it is the bare language and
not the effects of the language that forms the locus of compromise.2 24 But
if the presumption of hidden compromise is unsupported, as I have argued,
then textualism may inappropriately cordon off the initial inquiry into
whether the statute is ambiguous by ruling out sources of ambiguity outside
semantic context.
VII. Outlining an Alternative to the Bargaining Argument
This Article claims that the BA is undertheorized, even from a
textualist perspective, when it comes to the justification for the maximalist
position. In particular, strong textualists have not adequately explained
why courts should provide significant additional powers for political
minorities to block legislation, in addition to the extensive powers already
provided for through express constitutional provisions. Nor have they
explained why it is necessary for courts to adopt a blanket presumption of
compromise in order for lawmakers to effectively record compromise. In
this part, I briefly sketch a potential alternative to the BA and explain why
it is not foreclosed by the arguments that textualists have presented thus far.

222. As Richard Fallon has suggested, without "algorithmic prescriptions regarding the
content of interpretive contexts," the point at which a "reasonable interpreter" would declare the
language of the statute to be "decisively" clear will often involve normative value judgments. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of
Statutory Interpretation-And the Irreducible Roles of Values Judgments Within Both, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 685, 712-13, 692 & n.40 (2014).
223.

1 am not talking about reading the statute in a way that simply disregards the plain text

to further its broad remedial purposes. Rather, I am referring to the use of specific indicia of
purpose from the text or structure of the statute, or other sources like legislative history, to
determine "how the enacting legislature would have decided the interpretive question facing the
court." Redish & Chung, Democratic Theory, supra note 28, at 813 (1994). This has been
described as "intentionalism." See id. But I also refer to it as "moderate purposivism" in order to
draw a distinction with new textualism. See Richard H. Fallon, The Irreducible Roles of Values
and Judgment within Textualist as Well as Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation,
Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop, at 1 n.4 (2013) (subsuming "intentionalism" under the

rubric of purposivism).
224.

See Manning, What Divides, supra note 15, at 105-06.
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Under any faithful agency theory, Congress should have the ability to
preserve even compromises that contravene the statute's overriding
purpose. The reasons are so obvious as to require little elaboration.
Namely, Congress is supposed to make the laws and is, therefore, the body
responsible for balancing competing goals and political interests. Surely
the BA proves at least this much: the constitutionally ordained legislative
process seems designed to produce compromise, so courts should not set
about undoing open compromise to further the broad purposes of a statute.
In Part VI.C., I suggested that courts must abide by two principles to
ensure that Congress may effectively preserve the so-called "half a loaf'
compromises, concessions to political reality that produce apparent
statutory incoherence or incongruity. First, courts must respect open
compromise and consider specific evidence of compromise. Second, courts
must never contravene the direct and affirmative meaning of the text; that
is, clear language that provides a straightforward answer to the issue raised
in the case.
Beyond that, the BA does not justify the maximalist position toward
preserving hidden compromise. The fact that the absurd or implausible
implications of the plain meaning might have been some kind of cloakroom
bargain should not compel courts to presume that a bargain took place. As
discussed, structural inferences from the Constitution cannot do the
theoretical work to support this conclusion. There is simply not enough
information contained in the text and structure of the Constitution to
decisively support any specific interpretive theory. Manning's theory of
"clause-based structural inferences" as applied to the phrase "the judicial
power" has an apparent appeal because of its subtlety and, for lack of a
better word, its tidiness-its promise of an answer to a thorny question
without having to look (very far) outside the constitutional text. But given
its unsatisfying logic under close scrutiny, it does seem prudent to look
further afield for answers.
If we begin from the premise that courts are to be the faithful agents of
Congress when interpreting statutes, we may be left with an exercise in
practical wisdom: what principles of interpretation, in practice, are most
likely to capture the likely intent of legislators who enacted the law? A
messy exercise, to be sure, but messiness does not seem to be a strong
argument against undertaking it, in the absence of more explicit
constitutional guidance.
There is a balance to be struck between adhering to the plain text of a
statute and avoiding a suffocating literalism that needlessly undercuts the
Unfortunately, a blanket presumption of
statute's known purposes.
compromise will likely produce the second result. Professor Victoria
Nourse has identified a "supermajoritarian difficulty" with textualism,
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which is that it "may reproduce the effects of a filibuster rule by means of
statutory interpretation., 225 This concern applies with particular force to
the BA. By turning every phrase and word of a statute into a potentially
decisive exercise of a political minority's power, the argument "may
enshrine in law that which is directly contrary to the will not only of a
majority but [of] a supermajority." 226 Not only may the BA tip the scales
excessively toward political minorities, but it may also create a result that
no lawmaker-not even the staunchest opponents of a law-intended. The
risks of presuming compromise are potentially great.
A hidden compromise, as we have defined it, is a compromise that is
never disclosed to the public in any way. It is worth considering, as a
practical matter, whether the text, design, and purposes of the Constitution
support placing such a high premium on horse-trading behind closed doors,
at the risk of mangling a statute by failing to correct an inadvertent
oversight or drafting error. On the one hand, nothing in the Constitution
forbids secret legislative bargains, which have probably been around for as
long as there were legislatures. It is unlikely much could get done at all
without the ability to negotiate and draft bills behind closed doors. On the
other hand, the BA holds that courts must go out of their way-and often
out of the way of common sense-to preserve merely notional backroom
deals.
Chief Justice Roberts, quoting his predecessor, has written that the
227
Framers were "practical statesmen" and not metaphysical philosophers.
True enough. In this light, practical considerations about how to further
congressional intent should be weighed in the balance. First and foremost
is the fact that ours is a representative democracy, in which voters have the
right to select who will represent their interests in the federal government.
It would undermine the process of faithful representation to structure
statutory interpretation around hidden compromise, because the more
lawmakers are encouraged to strike secret deals, the more difficult it
becomes for voters to evaluate the quality of their representation as agents
of the citizenry. 228 James Wilson famously argued this agency principle at
the Constitutional Convention, stating, "[t]he people have a right to know
what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option

225. See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the
SupermajoritarianDifficulty, and the Separation ofPowers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1164 (2011).
226. Id.
227. Nat'l Fed'n ofindep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012).
228. For a more detailed criticism of Manning's theory from a civic republican perspective,
see Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1018-22 (2006).
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of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings.' ' 229 By declining to
privilege hidden compromise in the manner textualists suggest, courts
would force lawmakers to either expressly draw the boundaries of an
awkward compromise (i.e., "insurance purchased on federally-established
exchanges shall not be eligible for subsidies") or otherwise record that
compromise occurred through the text or legislative history.
A.

Forcing Legislative Choice

Because the practice is not forbidden by the Constitution, lawmakers
should have the ability to forge hidden compromise. But the system of
representative democracy created through the Constitution's express
provisions militates toward forcing representatives to make a choice.
Either they can embed a compromise in the text with such subtlety that it
looks like it could be a drafting error or inadvertent oversight, and risk
having a court correct the apparent error to further congressional intent or
they must put courts on notice that the bargain was intentional by turning it
into an open compromise. Either disguise or disclose. Under this view,
lawmakers would lose none of their drafting powers, but only the capacity
to conceal a textual compromise from the public. The public, in turn,
would gain informational power needed to evaluate the awkward
compromises forged by those elected to represent them.
This approach contains two important assumptions, which follow from
the discussion above. First, it is not difficult to clearly define the contours
of a compromise using language, at least to the extent that the compromise
anticipates specific expected applications of a statute, such as might appear
in a legal case.23 ° Second, it is, in fact, possible for legislators to disclose
the existence of compromise, particularly through legislative history.23'
To see how this either/or approach would look in practice, consider
once more King v. Burwell. Suppose that lawmakers did forge a hidden
compromise to prevent federally established exchanges from receiving tax
subsidies. If so, the manner in which this result was to be achieved in the
statute-by using the term "Exchange established by the State" in the
subsidy provisions-was suspiciously roundabout and indirect. (Even
putting aside whether this meaning was "plain.") What is more, the
lawmakers responsible for this compromise should have known that the
exclusion of insurance bought on federal exchanges would look highly
incongruous both to the public and to courts, given the stated purposes of
229. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 260 (Max Farrand ed., Yale
Univ. Press vol. 2 1911).
230. See Part VI.C.
231. See examples of open compromise described above in Part IV.A.2.
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the law. There is no obvious reason to distinguish between the two types of
exchanges, even if it is possible for courts to dream up a rational basis for
doing so. And there is no evidence of a compromise in legislative history
or anywhere else. What is clear is that barring the federal government from
subsidies severely undermines the central goal of reducing the number of
insured nationwide. Given that this drastic result is hidden in the fine print
of an enormous law, an interpreter could certainly conclude that there is a
reasonable-to-strong probability that the literal wording was merely the
232
Lawmakers involved in the compromise
product of sloppy drafting.
were, therefore, on notice that their bargain was potentially liable to be
swept out of the bill under standard interpretive principles set by the Court,
including the Court's textualists, to read statutes in light of their "language,
other factors as typically help courts
structure, context, history, and such
' 233
determine a statute's objectives. ,
The interpretive issue in cases like King, Barnhart, and Abramski,
boils down to who should bear the burden of statutory clarity. Particularly,
when a statute is large and complex, like the Affordable Care Act, the Gun
Control Act, the Coal Act, and many other statutes designed to address
complicated issues, it is impractical to put the onus on all the lawmakers
who voted for the law to catch all of its potential drafting flaws, including
potentially anomalous results created by the interactions of different
provisions that only a lawyer going through the bill with a fine-tooth comb
would catch. Modem statutes tend to function like a fine watch with
complex interlocking gears, in which a minor flaw in one can have
potentially drastic consequences for the whole. 234 As discussed above, the
nature of both the drafting process and lawmakers' resources means it is
nearly impossible to perform a complex legalistic analysis of the entire
statute. What is more, putting the burden on all lawmakers, as opposed to
232. See generally Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener's Error, 110 Nw. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016). Doerfler persuasively argues that the Court's current doctrine toward
drafting errors results in "systematic under-recognition" of such errors.
233. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 124 (2000) (unanimous on this point); see also
United States v. Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2013 (2011) (decision to read statute in light of
structure and purpose joined by Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor); Hall
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1891 (2012) (decision privileging statute's "plain language,
context, and structure" joined by Justices Sotomayor, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito); Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558 (2005) (decision of Justices Kennedy,
Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas describing "ordinary principles of statutory construction"
to include "examin[ing] the statute's text in light of context, structure, and related statutory

provisions").
234. A similar metaphor was made by Justice Scalia in McQuiggin, though to the opposite
effect. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1939 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
intricate craftsmanship (of a statute) tells us that the designer arranged things just as he wanted
them.").
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the horse traders, creates the possibility for devious legislators to place
small textual "bombs" or poison pills inside the statute, which are difficult
to catch but can do serious damage to the statutory scheme if they
,explode. ' 35
By contrast, placing the burden of clarity on the horse traders does not
necessarily prevent lawmakers from inserting language into a large statute
that will not be caught by his or her peers. 236 But it does make such
additions easier to catch if the horse-trading must either be written clearly
or disclosed to the public.
B.

Viability of (Moderate) Purposivism

The final question this Article will consider is how courts should
respond when confronted with a likely drafting error that significantly
undermines statutory coherence.
Professor Mark Seidenfeld recently coined the term "legislative
process failure" to refer to a situation "in which the best reading of the
words of the statute, using tools and the mechanism on which textualists
rely, is unlikely to derive the understanding of the statute to which most
legislators ascribed, or for issues on which legislators were likely to have
237
single-peaked preferences, the understanding of the median legislator.,
He argues that such "process failure generally warrants courts
accommodating the legislative mechanism for ascribing meaning to statutes
by considering legislative intent, which may counsel consideration of
235. Consider the stimulus law passed in 2009 by Congress in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis. Original versions of the bill placed sharp limits on bonuses that could be paid to
executives at companies received stimulus money. At the time, such bonuses were enormously
controversial. But the final language of the bill was apparently altered to create a loophole for
companies like AIG, which was widely viewed as one of the biggest culprits in the crisis. The
loophole was added by a single lawmaker, Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd, as part of a lastminute "backroom" deal that apparently some lawmakers who voted for the massive bill were
unaware of. Alexander Lane, Doddflip-flopped on whether he changedamendment on bonuses
to AIG and banks, TAMPA BAY TIMES: POLITIFACT (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.politifact.com/
truth-o-meter/statements/2009/mar/23/chris-dodd/Dodd-flip-flop-AIG-bonuses/.; Glenn Thrush,
Dodd: I worked on AIG provision, POLITICO: ON CONGRESS BLOG (Mar. 18, 2009),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/glennthrush/0309/On-second thoughtitwas-my-loophole.html
#. As one senator put it, "[t]he president goes out and says this is not acceptable and then some
backroom deal gets cut to let these things get paid out anyway." See supra. The particular
provision in that case was direct and unambiguous, such that a court would be bound to enforce it
regardless of statutory context, structure, or purpose. But the point is that it would be that much
easier for a minority of lawmakers to purposefully insert subtle language (think "established by
the State") that would be unlikely to be caught by the majority, in the hope that a court would
interpret the statute in a highly literal manner.
236. See Dodd example described in note 233.
237. Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 467, 487 (2014) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, ProcessFailure].
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It is no doubt true that legislative history may be

helpful where the plain language and the policy context conflict, as in
Sigmon, where the congressional record included explanations of two of the
Senators sponsoring the Coal Act, supporting the commonsense notion that
successors of interests of signatory operators also had obligations to retired
coal works, just as successors to "related persons" did.239
But such extratextual indications of intent might not always be
available. In King, for example, the government could not point to specific
statements in the legislative history or anywhere else to directly support its
position that the phrase "Established by the State" was meant to include
exchanges established by the federal government acting in the place of a
4 More fundamentally, it is not clear that the concept of a unified
state.240
legislative "mechanism" for ascribing meaning to statutes is intelligible in
situations where the official legislative materials do not address the
interpretive issue directly. Seidenfeld's approach may have promise but
requires further elucidation.
Rather than distinguishing between the judicial and legislative
perspectives, a simpler and more traditional approach would be to consider
any information probative of congressional intent, while treating the text as
primary. In most cases, traditional interpretive tools, aided by common
sense, will reveal whether the anomalous result of a plain text reading was
more likely to have been intentional or inadvertent. There can be no
precise standard for making this determination, but common factors are
likely to include: the size and complexity of the statute, the degree to which
the literal language speaks directly to the interpretive issue, whether the
issue is one lawmakers would have likely considered during drafting, the
degree to which a literal reading interferes with the statute's express
objectives, and whether the anomaly is created by a single textual provision
or by several provisions working in concert (the second circumstance
appears more likely to go unnoticed by lawmakers). In general, two of the
most helpful tools for answering this question will be statutory structure
and context. Structure helps courts understand how the statute is supposed
to function as a whole, and what purposes specific provisions are designed

238. Id. at 529.
239. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 at 466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. See generally Brief for the Respondents, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No.
14-114), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/14-114-Respondents-Brief
.pdf. But see Mark Seidenfeld, Tax Credits on Federally Created Exchanges: Lessons from a
Legislative Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 99 MINN. L. REv. 101, 127-28
(2014) (arguing that the common legislative understanding that insurance purchased on federally
established exchanges would be eligible for subsidies is evident from the very silence of the
legislative history on this issue).
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to play. Context, including policy context, illuminates how various parts of
the statute are meant to interact to form the whole.
If a court determines that the anomalous results of a literal reading are
likely due to inadvertence or mistake, it may then be appropriate for the
court to play a gap-filling role to preserve the intent manifested by statutory
structure and purposes. Yes, this is a form of purposivism, but it is
purposivism as "last resort," which is narrowly and carefully
circumscribed, and consistent with faithful agency. Modem political
science-and common sense, again-tell us that there can be no unified
intent of a large multi-member body like Congress, and this is a point
frequently emphasized by textualists. But accepting this point as true does
not gainsay permitting courts to posit a fictional congressional intent in
cases where the statutory context indicates a lack of intent as to incoherent
results, leaving a gap to fill. In this rare event, there may be no better
answer than to make
what Manning calls a "presumption of reasonableness
24 1
and coherence.,
Manning quotes Judge Richard Posner as a sophisticated exemplar of
this view. 242 In Friedrichv. City of Chicago, Judge Posner wrote:
When a court can figure out what Congress probably was
driving at and how its goal can be achieved, it is not
usurpation-it is interpretation in a sense that has been
orthodox since Aristotle-for the court to complete (not
enlarge) the statute by reading it to bring about the end that
the legislators would have specified had they thought about
it more clearly or used a more perspicuous form of
words.243
Posner's view does not imply that courts may simply rewrite a statute that
speaks in language that is crystal clear. To do so would undermine the
statute rather than "completing" it. Congress has the right to legislate to
produce odd or awkward results. However, absent specific evidence that
Congress intended such results, it may be unfaithful to congressional intent
to presume compromise. Manning's primary response to Judge Posner's
approach is that the BA forecloses it as a matter of constitutional
interpretation. 244 If, however, as I have argued, the BA does not provide
241.

See generally Manning, Competing Presumptions,supra note 113, at 2024.

242. Id.at 2015-16.
243. Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 499 U.S. 933 (1991).
244. See Manning, Competing Presumptions,supra note 113, at 2027-41.
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sufficient justification to support the maximalist position regarding hidden
compromise, then perhaps something along the lines of this approach may
still be regarded as both prudent and consistent with the Constitution.
There is not space in this Article to fully defend a moderate form of
purposivism. There may be other, more functional arguments against this
approach. But the takeaway is that textualists may have been too quick to
believe that they have a constitutional trump card. The BA has been
employed to demonstrate that a thoroughgoing textualist methodology is
mandated by the Constitution. It this Article is correct, that claim has been
overstated, and at a minimum, other interpretive methodologies, including
forms of purpovisim, remain constitutionally viable.

Conclusion
Many of the recent debates over textualism have focused on the use of
legislative history as an interpretive tool. 245 Even today, a disproportionate

amount of scholarship critiquing textualism seems to focus on the
legislative history question.246 But in recent years the landscape has
shifted, and legislative history is no longer the primary focus or foundation
of "new textualism. ' ,247 As Manning has written, "second-generation
textualism relies less upon skeptical empirical claims about the
(un)reliability of legislative history, and more upon conceptual claims
about the crucial role of legislative compromise in our constitutional
system and the consequences for interpretation that flow from such a
conclusion.,, 248 In other words, second-generation textualism relies largely
on the BA.
This Article has provided a critical analysis of the BA. My general
conclusion is that while the argument supports the preservation of open
compromise by adhering closely to the semantic meaning of statutes as
written, it does not support the same approach with regard to hidden
compromise, the existence of which is uncertain by definition. In light of
this conclusion, I argued that some form of moderate and narrowly
circumscribed purposivism remains a viable alternative, in cases where a

245. See Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 45, at 1289-90 (noting that firstgeneration textualism focused heavily on arguments concerning the reliability of legislative
history).
246.

See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (New York, Oxford University

Press 2014); Victoria Nourse, The Constitution and Legislative History, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
313 (2014); Seidenfeld, Process Failure,supra note 235; Bressman & Gluck, supra note 115, at
741.
247.
248.

See Manning, Second-Generation,supra note 45, at 1290.
Id.
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court has reason to believe the anomalous results of a literal reading are the
product of legislative inadvertence or mistake.
Although in many ways the gap between textualists and purposivists
on the Supreme Court has narrowed, 249 King and other decisions
demonstrate that fundamental differences remain. In particular, textualists
and purposivists have different thresholds for when to consider a statute to
be "clear," "plain," or "unambiguous," and what kinds of evidence should
be considered to reach this conclusion. In light of these differences, it
seems likely that textualist judges on the Supreme Court and elsewhere will
continue to invoke some form of the Bargaining Argument to argue for a
narrower and more literalistic reading of the text on the ground that it may
contain compromise. There may be sound practical reasons for taking this
approach, or there may not be. But, to the extent textualists argue that the
Constitution compels courts to preserve hidden compromise to the
maximum extent possible, I believe this argument will ultimately be found
unpersuasive.

249.

See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113 (2011).
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